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Abstract 
Water-related tensions are expected to increase globally due to intensifying water scarcity, ecosys-
tem degradation, population growth and the related soaring water demand and climate change. Wa-
ter diplomacy can complement existing water cooperation activities through its focus on politics and 
utilization of diplomatic negotiation tools, facilitating peaceful solutions to conflicts over shared wa-
ters. 
Recent studies have used past water interactions, geographic and socio-economic data as well as 
megatrend analyses to assess future hydro-political risk on a global scale. This analysis develops a 
framework for a finer scale i.e. regional and national water diplomacy analysis, and tests it in two 
case study regions: Central Asia and Iraq. The analysis is based on relevant parts of the report “Ve-
sidiplomatia - ennakoivaa rauhanvälitystoimintaa” (Water Diplomacy - Proactive Peace Media-
tion), which was commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland and completed in 
March 2019. 
The analytical framework is established using basic analysis and scenario techniques and focusing 
on the potential to create linkages between water cooperation and diplomatic tools through negoti-
ations, conflict resolution mechanisms and joint fact-finding missions. 
Methodologically, the main result of the study is the establishment and testing of an analytical 
framework for water diplomacy, which includes three steps: i) analysis of current state, ii) recogni-
tion of two potential Conflict Paths (based on a basic megatrend analysis and a simplified scenario 
process), and iii) possible water diplomacy actions to complement existing water governance ar-
rangements. The two potential Conflict Paths were created until 2030, with one path focusing on 
water as a key source of conflict and other on geopolitical tensions extending also to water resources 
management. 
Context-specific results from the case studies highlight the potential and limitations of water diplo-
macy efforts to prevent and mediate water-related conflicts in Central Asia and Iraq. In Central 
Asia, for example, there is a clear need to renew outdated regional water treaties but a lack of trust 
between actors has hindered progress. As such, the study complements recent global analyses on 
hydro-political tensions as well as regional analyses on transboundary cooperation and conflict in 
the case study regions. 
The study highlights the multifaceted nature of water cooperation, complementing it with a water 
diplomacy view. The results indicate the potential for more thorough use of water diplomacy tools 
such as mediation and arbitration to complement on-going cooperation and governance activities. 
Water diplomacy can also be the most feasible way forward in heavily politicized contexts such as 
Iraq, paving way for long-term water cooperation. Further focus should be put on developing the 
analytical framework by utilising more detailed quantitative analyses as well as interviews and 
workshops with local experts. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Valtioiden välisten veteen liittyvien jännitteiden arvioidaan yleistyvän ilmastonmuutoksen, väes-
tönkasvun ja kasvavan veden niukkuuden johdosta. Vesidiplomatian tavoitteena on hyödyntää dip-
lomatiatyökaluja vesivaroihin liittyvien konfliktien ennaltaehkäisyssä ja sovittelussa. Vesidiploma-
tia voi myös täydentää olemassa olevia veteen liittyviä yhteistyömekanismeja. 
Useat viimeaikaiset tutkimukset ovat käyttäneet menneitä veteen liittyviä tapahtumia, maantieteel-
listä ja yhteiskunnallis-taloudellista tietoa sekä megatrendianalyysejä tulevaisuuden vesikonflikti-
riskien kartoituksessa globaalilla tasolla. Tämän analyysin tavoitteena on kehittää viitekehys tar-
kemmalle vesidiplomatia-analyysille esimerkiksi alueelliselle tai kansalliselle tasolle ja arvioida sen 
toimivuutta kahdella tapaustutkimuksella, joiden kohteet ovat Keski-Aasia ja Irak.  Analyysi perus-
tuu Suomen ulkoministeriön tilaamaan ”Vesidiplomatia - ennakoivaa rauhanvälitystoimintaa” ti-
laustutkimukseen, joka valmistui maaliskuussa 2019. 
Vesidiplomatian analyyttinen kehys muodostetaan käyttämällä yksinkertaisia analyysi- ja skenaa-
riomenetelmiä ja keskittymällä kytkösten muodostamiseen vesivarayhteistyön ja diplomatian välille 
erilaisten diplomatiatyökalujen (esimerkiksi neuvottelut, konfliktien ratkaisumekanismit ja yhteiset 
tiedonkeruumatkat) avulla. 
Tutkimuksen menetelmällinen tulos on vesidiplomatiaan liittyvän analyyttisen viitekehyksen pe-
rustaminen ja testaus. Viitekehyksen luoma lähestymistapa koostuu kolmesta osasta: i) tutkittavan 
alueen nykytilan kartoitus ii) kahden veteen liittyvän konfliktipolun luominen ja iii) suositeltujen 
toimenpiteiden muodostaminen. Mahdolliset konfliktipolut kehitettiin vuoteen 2030 niin, että toi-
sen lähtökohtana on veteen liittyvät jännitteet ja toisen poliittiset jännitteet. 
Tapaustutkimuksien tulokset korostavat vesidiplomatiaan liittyvien toimenpiteiden mahdollisuuk-
sia ja rajoituksia veteen liittyvien konfliktien ennaltaehkäisyssä ja rauhanvälityksessä Irakissa ja 
Keski-Aasiassa. Esimerkiksi Keski-Aasiassa on suuri tarve uudistaa vanhentuneita vesisopimuksia, 
mutta valtioiden välinen luottamuksen puute on hidastanut kehitystä. Analyysi täydentää viimeai-
kaisia globaaleja vesijännitteisiin liittyviä tutkimuksia sekä alueellisia valtioiden välisiin yhteistyö-
mekanismeihin ja konflikteihin liittyviä selvityksiä. 
Tämä tutkimus korostaa vesivarayhteistyön moninaisuutta tutkimalla rajat ylittävää vesiyhteistyötä 
vesidiplomatian näkökulmasta. Tuloksien perusteella vesidiplomatian työkaluilla on paljon mah-
dollisuuksia täydentää olemassa olevia yhteistyömekanismeja ja hallinnollista kehikkoa. Vesidiplo-
matia voi olla toimiva tapa edetä vahvasti politisoituneissa konteksteissa (esim. Irak), joissa saavu-
tettu vesiyhteistyö voi toimia muiden poliittisten jännitteiden lievittäjänä. Analyyttistä viitekehystä 
tulee kehittää tulevaisuudessa mm. läpikotaisemmalla kvantitatiivisella analyysillä sekä vuoropu-
helulla ja työpajoilla paikallisten asiantuntijoiden kanssa. 
Avainsanat Vesidiplomatia, Vesivarayhteistyö, Konfliktipolut, Keski-Aasia, Irak 
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 1 Introduction 
 
Water is a critical prerequisite for human life. It is the only natural resource that transcends 
national boundaries in a concrete and easily measurable manner through shared rivers, lakes 
and groundwater aquifers. Due to its political, economic, social and environmental interde-
pendencies, water resources can either foster cooperation or create conflict (1, 2). Competi-
tion over shared waters is expected to rise as the effects of climate change, population growth, 
urbanization and water scarcity intensify (3). 
 
Water diplomacy can complement existing water cooperation through its focus on politics 
and the utilization of diplomatic negotiation tools, facilitating peaceful solutions to conflicts 
over shared waters (4). Depending on the context, water diplomacy can play a vital role in 
situations where politics rule over all aspects of water cooperation or, on the contrary, when 
political tensions are not taken into account sufficiently (3). The rapidly rising importance of 
water diplomacy was addressed by the Council of the European Union (EU) in 2018, with 
the intention to “enhance EU diplomatic engagement about water as a tool for peace, security 
and stability” (5). Yet, due to the novelty of the topic, related research has been carried out 
mostly on a global scale and there is a lack of finer scale analyses and few established ana-
lytical frameworks. 
 
The primary objective of this thesis was to establish an analytical framework for water di-
plomacy. To help with the objective, the following Research Questions were identified: 
 
• How to define water diplomacy? 
• What are the key elements of an analytical framework for water diplomacy? 
• How can scenario thinking help to recognize potential for water diplomacy actions? 
 
A fundamental part of the thesis was the multidisciplinary report “Vesidiplomatia - ennakoi-
vaa rauhanvälitystoimintaa” (Water Diplomacy - Proactive Peace Mediation), commissioned 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA) in October 2018 and published in 
March 2019 (6). The report has four authors, with the author of this thesis as its main author. 
The objective of the report was to analyse two geopolitically interesting regions from a water 
diplomacy point of view. In order to perform a thorough analysis which could be reproduced 
in the future, an analytical framework for water diplomacy was required. The establishment 
of this analytical framework then became the foundation for this thesis. The case study re-
gions of Central Asia and Iraq were chosen in a related workshop.  
 
The most prevalent limitation for the work on the report was time, as the case study regions 
required a vast amount of background research and the MFA was operating on a tight sched-
ule. Therefore, it was crucial to create the analytical framework in such a manner that it in-
cluded sufficient regional context to form feasible scenarios and water diplomacy actions. 
 
The thesis is structured in the following way. First, I describe the research context through 
two focus points: water cooperation as well as security and diplomacy, with an emphasis on 
water security, before moving on to the methodology section. In the results section, I establish 
the analytical framework before showcasing findings from the Central Asia case study. The 
main findings of the Iraq case study can be found in Appendix 1. In the discussion section, I 
assess the analytical framework and case study results before concluding the thesis. 
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2 Research Context 
 
This thesis builds on two main fields of study: water cooperation as well as security and 
diplomacy, with a special focus on water security. Both of these fields were studied using a 
comprehensive literature review in order to form a general context for water diplomacy. 
2.1 Water cooperation 
Water has been described as the bloodstream of the planet as it drives the critical functions 
of many terrestrial systems, such as forests, woodlands, grasslands and crop lands (7). While 
water is one of the most common resources in the world, only a fraction (2.5%) of it is 
available for human consumption, with the vast majority of fresh water being confined to 
glaciers and permanent snow cover (8). Water cooperation is crucial as global water chal-
lenges grow increasingly difficult to manage. 
 
Global water consumption is rising much faster than human population growth, roughly dou-
bling every 20 years (9). The United Nations (UN) states that in 2018, 844 million people 
lacked access to safe drinking water (2). Over-exploitation and pollution can have dire con-
sequences on water supplies, which might lead to international tensions when the impacts 
spread (10). Practically every state with land borders shares water resources with its neigh-
bours and there are approximately 286 transboundary river basins, which serve as a primary 
source of freshwater for 40% of the global population (1, 10, 11). Yet, about 60% of inter-
national river basins lack any cooperative management framework (12). 
 
Water cooperation can be defined as different actors working together in regard to water use 
(13). It relies on actors acknowledging that working together on shared watercourses is more 
beneficial than unilateral actions (4). Water cooperation is integrally linked with agriculture 
and energy production (14). The major component of human water use is agriculture, which 
takes up over 70% of the share, followed by 20% to industry and 10% to households (15). 
Additionally, water pollution has become an issue in major rivers in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America due to outdated agricultural methods (9). In regions such as Central Asia tensions 
between downstream and upstream countries are historically linked with hydropower pro-
jects due to the effects of dams on river flow (16). Growing water scarcity and the effects of 
climate change on temporal and spatial water availability heighten these tensions. 
 
Water cooperation is therefore by no means easy. Genderen and Rood (17) identify the fol-
lowing obstacles for successful water cooperation: 
 
1. an upstream hegemon without the political will to cooperate;  
2. conflicting perceptions of water entitlements;  
3. rapid demographic or environmental changes in the river or aquifer basin;  
4. large unilateral development projects without consultation;  
5. lack of a treaty between riparian states;  
6. absence of River Basin Organisations (RBO); and  
7. general hostile political relations. 
 
These obstacles can be solved with good bilateral relations, regional treaties, RBOs and ac-
tions to ease water scarcity and interdependence (17). International treaties, cooperative 
mechanisms and knowledge sharing are examples of possible tools to ease tensions (18). 
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The importance of water cooperation has been recognised globally. In September 2015, all 
of the 193 members of the UN unanimously agreed to “Transforming the World: the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development” (the 2030 Agenda) with 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and 169 global targets (19). The importance of water cooperation is high-
lighted by SDG 6, which aims for sustainable water management and sanitation for all (2). 
The 6.5 target recognizes the importance of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM)  by stating the need to “implement IWRM at all levels, including through trans-
boundary cooperation as appropriate” (19). The indicators for target 6.5 are: “Degree of In-
tegrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) implementation (0–100)” and “Proportion 
of transboundary basin area with an operational arrangement for water cooperation” (19).  
 
Transboundary water cooperation relies on the understanding that shared water management 
is beneficial for all involved parties (4). This is in line with the principles of IWRM, which 
state that water, land and related resources should be developed in unison to maximize eco-
nomic and social welfare as well as sustainable development (20,21). Daoudy (22) lists nu-
merous benefits of basin-wide cooperation such as flood control, drought mitigation, hydro-
power and optimal environmental management but also warns about inequitable access to 
water being a trigger for conflicts. While IWRM has been addressed and identified as an 
important aspect of water cooperation through the SDGs, the core issue is that a universal 
blueprint for implementation remains elusive (2, 21). 
 
The 2018 UN SDG 6 Synthesis Report (2) states that average implementation of IWRM is 
as high as 48%. However, there are great variations between countries, with developing 
countries not in line to meet the targets set for 2030 (2). Criticism towards IWRM imple-
mentation generally focuses on a lack of practical instructions on how to apply it, dysfunc-
tional institutional frameworks, vague goals and targets and a disregard for local contexts 
and social aspects (23–25). Despite these issues, IWRM might well be the best available 
option for a comprehensive water cooperation and management tool currently available. 
 
International water treaties provide a legal framework for regional and bilateral water coop-
eration that also reflect on the national level. Currently there are two active international 
water treaties: the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention 
on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Waters (1992) 
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses (1997), commonly known as the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC) (26). 
 
The UNECE Convention was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1996 (27). It was 
initially negotiated as a regional instrument, but it has since been amended to become uni-
versally available (28). The main contents of the UNECE water convention relate to pre-
venting, mitigating and controlling transboundary water problems and it has been ratified by 
42 states and the European Union (28). The UNWC was adopted in 1997 and it entered into 
force in 2014 (27). It is considered to be the primary legal instrument for transboundary 
water management and as of 2019 it has been ratified by 36 states (26, 27). The UNWC 
contains three key principles of international water law: 
 
• The principle of equitable and reasonable use 
• The obligation not to cause significant harm 
• The duty to cooperate (prior notification of works which may affect co-riparian 
states) 
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Due to the history of the two conventions, there have been suggestions of mutual exclusive-
ness. However, research has shown that the conventions rather complement each other (29). 
The UNECE water convention provides generally more detailed guidelines especially re-
lated to water quality standards and the prevention of transboundary impacts, while the 
UNWC contains more guidance on equitable and reasonable use (28, 29). Together the two 
global conventions provide crucial elements for improving transboundary water cooperation. 
 
The key critique of the UNECE water convention and UNWC is that as there is no universal 
recognition of key principles. Many states prefer to negotiate their own treaties and only 
accommodate the parts of the conventions which suit them (26). The issues are highlighted 
in upstream and downstream riparian relations where many states consider the conventions 
to be biased. McIntyre (30) notes that “upstream states tend to favour the principle of equi-
table and reasonable use while downstream states invoke the duty to prevent significant 
transboundary harm” while Phillips (26) highlights the issue of “basin hegemons” or politi-
cally dominant states neglecting the principles in order to reserve transboundary waters for 
their own use. However, despite the misinterpretations and misgivings, the principles do 
often function as guidelines that influence states that are not parties to the conventions (31). 
 
The relationship between water cooperation and conflicts is fascinating, with recent UN Sec-
retary Generals having all declared that competition over scarce water resources could lead 
to violent conflicts. In 2017, Secretary General António Guterrez highlighted the links be-
tween water cooperation, peace and security by stating that “water serves as a catalyst for 
cooperation among nations, even those that are not on good terms” (32). While strictly water 
conflicts are yet to surface, the possibility has not disappeared and the probability is lifted 
due to global water challenges, such as uneven distribution, eroding quality and misuse as 
well as societal tensions (21, 26, 33, 34). 
 
The possibilities of water as a cooperative instrument are widely acknowledged (1, 17, 21, 
26, 32). In fact, there are many more cases about shared water cooperation than water con-
flicts (295 international water agreements since 1948 and only 37 incidents of acute conflicts 
over water) (10, 35). A recent report by the Strategic Foresight Group (11), highlights the 
importance of transboundary water cooperation, by stating that “any two countries engaged 
in active water cooperation do not go to war for any reason”. Zeitoun and Mirumachi (36) 
state that in order to obtain a wider perspective, the separate concepts of conflicts and coop-
eration should be merged into interactions. Water diplomacy efforts could also benefit from 
the consideration of the dual nature of these interactions, when preventing and mitigating 
transboundary water conflicts. 
2.2 Security & diplomacy 
The second field of study related to water diplomacy introduces general security and diplo-
macy aspects of modern society, with an emphasis on water security. 
 
Security 
Security has several dimensions and scales. Haftendorn (37) discusses security from a na-
tional, international and global perspective while Buzan (38) argues that it is divided into 
five interlinked sectors: military, political, economic, societal and environmental. In order 
to analyse national and international security, all of these concepts need to be studied indi-
vidually to understand their connectivity (39). 
 
   
 5 
The concept of security has developed considerably since the Cold War, becoming much 
more multifaceted and complex (39). In the past, state security was prevalent, with emphasis 
on responding to military, political and economic threats (40). Buzan (40) broadened the 
framework of security by introducing societal and environmental security sectors. 
 
Societal threats are closely linked to the political sector as they deal with identity and balance 
(and lack of balance) that can be found in any given state (39). Most modern conflicts have 
societal elements, such as in Afghanistan, where cultural ideological and ethnic differences 
make up tribal boundaries, which have been bundled into a state (40). The environmental 
sector is hard to define and sometimes controversial as natural disasters are impossible to 
control, but more recently human induced environmental threats such as global warming 
have emerged (39). The interconnectivity of the sectors is apparent as effective counter ini-
tiatives to these widespread effects require economic and political security (40). 
 
The Finnish concept for comprehensive security aims to mitigate all security threats through 
mutual cooperation by all societal sectors: authorities, private sector, organisations and citi-
zens (41). This desirable approach is not without issues though, as it needs to deal with the 
conflicting ambitions of the different sectors. Keskinen et al. (42) identify the need for pro-
cesses that bring together the differing sectoral needs and information as well as further study 
on relevant power relations and policy. 
 
Diplomacy 
Diplomacy is an important aspect of international security, which complements internal se-
curity aspects (43). Diplomacy can be loosely defined as “the art and practice of conducting 
negotiations between nations” (44). It is strongly connected to foreign affairs and foreign 
policy, with the former providing the general subject and the latter the specific manifestation 
(44). Diplomacy itself is mostly used to prevent conflicts and to improve cooperation 
through negotiations, discussion and fact finding missions (45, 46). 
 
In the past, diplomacy focused solely on state security. While modern diplomacy still needs 
to respond to state security threats, a great deal of attention is put to human security, which 
constitutes the health and security of human beings and their environment (45). Modern dip-
lomats need to rapidly adapt to this changing diplomatic environment by understanding the 
needs of both of these sectors through efficient science-policy interaction (18, 45). 
 
Hocking et al. (45) introduce the concept and framework of integrative diplomacy (Figure 
1) which intends to capture key characteristics for appreciating diplomatic challenges for 
policy makers in the modern era. The four identified dimensions of the framework are: con-
text and locations, rules and norms, communication patterns and actor roles (45). The need 
for collaborative relationships is highlighted and could be achieved through knowledge ex-
change which aims to bring researchers, decision-makers and other relevant stakeholders 
together (18). To aid in this task, Reed et al. (18) introduces five principles of knowledge 
exchange: design, represent, engage, impact and reflect and sustain. 
 
   
 6 
Another important concept is multi-track diplomacy, which was developed to ease peace 
building processes by identifying actors and their operating environments. Track I mainly 
consists of state actors while track II constitutes non-governmental actors, such as experts 
and non-governmental organisations (NGO) (47, 48). Other tracks range from track III: busi-
ness to track IX: public opinion and media (49). The crucial aspect of multi-track diplomacy 
is the realization that negotiations are often taking place at several levels, which might lead 
to different tracks becoming intertwined (48). In fact, it is improbable that a solution can be 
found by focusing solely on a single track, especially in complex situations, such as bilateral 
water security related issues. 
 
Water security 
Water is often identified as a crucial part of global security threats as it is essential for all 
aspects of life (21). Fear of wide-spread water-related conflicts rose during the latter part of 
the 20th century as epitomized by Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of the World Bank (33): 
“the wars of the next century will be fought over water unless we change our approach to 
managing this precious and vital resource”. These fears led to further research on water se-
curity and its aspects. 
 
UN Water defines water security as “the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable 
access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human 
well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne 
pollution and water related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace 
and political stability” (50). Wouters (51) identified three important elements for water se-
curity: 
 
• Freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in human dignity 
• Conflicts of interest must be identified and effectively dealt with at international, 
national and local levels 
• Water security is a dynamic concept that requires local champions and sustained 
stewardship  
 
Initially, water security focused on the quantity and quality of water resources, such as pol-
lution, relative distribution and absolute distribution, but newer definitions have taken into 
account other interlinked aspects, such as food and energy (52, 53). In response to concep-
Integrative 
Diplomacy
Actors and Roles
Context and 
Locations
Rules and Norms
Communication 
Patterns
Figure 1: Integrative diplomacy, modified from (45) 
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tualizations that relied solely on the physical aspects of water resources, Zeitoun (54) devel-
oped the “global web of national water security” (Figure 2), which consists of six interlinked 
security sectors: human, national, water resources, food, energy and climate security (55). 
This broad definition places sustainable water security in the center of the web where it is 
interpreted as the balance point between the different forces (56). The web also connects 
diplomacy to water security through the dimension of human security (21, 45). 
 
As noted in Figure 2, water security is closely intertwined with other sectors, especially food 
production, which is the largest consumer of water globally (46, 56, 57). Increased droughts 
and heatwaves combined with fluctuating growing seasons and precipitation patterns are 
expected to have a huge impact on crop yields in the future, which is why water efficiency, 
agricultural productivity and technologies related to the reuse of water and wastewater need 
to be improved in order to meet the rising demand (58, 59). All of these sectors are brought 
together by the water-food-energy security nexus approach, which concentrates on the inter-
linkages of the sectors (60, 61). 
 
IWRM has been proposed as the mechanism to ensure water security, but as mentioned in 
the previous chapter its implementation has proved to be challenging (21). Emerging trends 
such as securitization of water resources has considerable implications for water security, as 
on one hand it might lead to nations safeguarding water resources from others, while on the 
other it could lead to the establishment of international agreements over shared waters (56). 
 
There is growing international consensus that further research and actions related to water 
security are essential for the future as they address conflicts that arise over shared water 
resources (62). As global water challenges highlight the importance of water in international 
relations, diplomats need to become accustomed to the linkages of water to all aspects of 
societal security. In the future, water security development schemes should take into account 
pressing human security needs while advancing transboundary water management (21). 
Figure 2: Global web of national water security (54) 
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2.3 Water diplomacy 
Natural, societal and political interactions are at the heart of complex water-related problems 
(63, 64). There is an increasing demand for efficient solutions to these issues that mix policy, 
security and science instead of only addressing water in isolation (18, 54, 63, 65). Water 
diplomacy takes into account crucial dimensions of integrative diplomacy to work as a 
method for water security in order to achieve peaceful water cooperation. Three further def-
initions of water diplomacy are outlined in Text Box 1. 
 
From the definitions in Text Box 1, the following conclusions can be made. The aim of water 
diplomacy is to facilitate cooperation over water resources using diplomatic instruments (4). 
The scope of water diplomacy encompasses state and non-state actors and it is used to both 
prevent and resolve conflicts (4, 14, 17). The ultimate aim of water diplomacy is cooperation, 
stability and peace. 
 
Previous studies on water diplomacy 
The aforementioned definitions do not explicitly distinguish different levels of water diplo-
macy. Genderen and Rood (17) identify three levels: bilateral, multilateral and basin wide, 
which are all connected by a global framework. There is a wide variety of publications dis-
cussing the different aspects of water diplomacy, yet previous research has largely focused 
on understanding the phenomena behind water conflicts, defining water diplomacy and stud-
ying it on a global scale instead of more detailed regional or national analyses (1, 36, 46, 63, 
66). I will next shortly introduce key publications related to water diplomacy. 
 
Zeitoun and Mirumachi (36) recognized the coexistence of conflicts and cooperation and 
created a new approach, the Transboundary Water Interaction NexuS (TWINS) to analyse 
them in regard to international transboundary water management. The key finding of the 
TWINS approach is that basins differ in their international transboundary relations when 
relations shift through conflict and cooperation (36). With the approach it is possible to clas-
sify transboundary water relations and to illustrate the dynamics of conflicts and coopera-
tion. 
 
 
Water diplomacy, also referred to as hydro-diplomacy, can be broadly defined as all 
contact between (non-) state actors and at least one state or international governmental 
organizations over transboundary freshwater resources such as lake, river and aquifer 
basins (17). 
 
Water diplomacy includes all measures by state and non-state actors that can be under-
taken to prevent or peacefully resolve (emerging) conflicts and facilitate cooperation re-
lated to water availability, allocation or use between and within states and public and 
private stakeholders (14). 
 
Water diplomacy can be defined as the use of diplomatic instruments to existing or emerg-
ing disagreements and conflicts over shared water resources with the aim to solve or 
mitigate those for the sake of cooperation, regional stability and peace (4). 
 
Text Box 1: Definitions of water diplomacy 
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Islam and Susskind (63) identify six key tasks or “best practices” for water diplomacy: stake-
holder representation, joint fact-finding and scenario planning, value creation, convening, 
collaborative adaptive management and societal learning. They then use these findings to 
create a water diplomacy framework, which provides guidelines for solving actual water 
management issues (Figure 3) (63). 
These guidelines recognise the complexity of water networks and challenges and intend to 
take into account diverse and interdisciplinary interests of all sectors. It builds upon the 
global web of national water security by Zeitoun (54) and acknowledges the need to create 
interactions between actors through such practices as stakeholder representation and value 
creation (18).  
 
In 2014, Adelphi stated that international policymakers and technical experts should work 
together to advance conflict prevention and create more efficient cooperation mechanisms 
(1). This is echoed by Reed et al. (18) who state that interactions between stakeholders are 
often conducted without systematic and research-based grounding. The Adelphi report (1) 
alongside Huntjens and de Man (46) highlight the importance of engaging state and non-
state actors in the creation of RBOs and negotiating international water treaties.  
 
Farinosi et al. (66) provide a quantitative basis for the assessment of SDG 6.5 and in partic-
ular indicator 6.5.2 involving transboundary water cooperation. The article is a good exam-
ple of a technical global-scale water diplomacy analysis that builds upon the idea of Zeitoun 
and Mirumachi to merge tensions and cooperation together as interactions (36, 66). The loss 
of definition is irrelevant, as the interactions indicate water allocation or management issues 
regardless of their nature. 
 
Farinosi et al. (66) establish a baseline scenario through the use of representative concentra-
tion pathways (RCP) in order to identify future water conflict prone areas. The RCPs are 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentration trajectories adopted by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2014, which aim to represent corresponding climate 
Figure 3: The Water Diplomacy Framework (63) 
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conditions in the future (67). The identified hotspots (Figure 4) constitute areas of possible 
hydro-political risk, that could be aided through cooperative action (66). 
Population density, water availability, upstream/downstream dynamics, territorial and power 
imbalance and climatic conditions represent the most relevant factors for hydro-political in-
teractions (66). The results can be misleading though, as they don’t take into account histor-
ical, cultural and religious aspects. For example, Kibaroglu et al. (68) highlight the need for 
regional water cooperation to accommodate pressing human security needs which directly 
contribute to water conflicts especially in the Middle East. 
 
All of the aforementioned works have studied water conflicts and water diplomacy potential 
on a global scale. Farinosi et al. (66) tries to predict the likelihood of hydro-political inter-
actions by combining various data sources and past tensions, but one key ingredient is miss-
ing. Both Zeitoun (54) and Huntjens and de Man (46) state, that in order to efficiently study 
regional and national contexts, much more care needs to be put into understanding aspects 
such as political history, culture, religion and their effects. 
 
Water diplomacy vs. water cooperation 
What separates water diplomacy from water cooperation and transboundary water manage-
ment is the instruments, as water diplomacy is about applying diplomatic instruments in 
unison with technical ones (4). These instruments include negotiations, dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, the establishment of consultation platforms and the organization of joint fact-
finding missions (4, 63, 69). Water diplomacy actions can lead to a wide variety of outcomes, 
such as scientific and economic cooperation, international treaties and joint institutions (17). 
 
Another difference between water diplomacy and water cooperation is the baseline assump-
tion (4). Water cooperation and transboundary water management are based on the recogni-
tion of mutual benefits from shared water resources by all relevant parties (22). Water diplo-
macy on the other hand deals with disagreements, which arise from conflicting interests (4). 
Despite these definitive differences, water diplomacy has enormous potential to complement 
the more technical fields and vice versa by bringing different actors together (3, 63). 
Figure 4: Changes in likelihood of hydro-political issues (66) 
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Water diplomacy actors 
Multi-track water diplomacy recognizes the importance of different level actors in negotiat-
ing water treaties and establishing RBOs (1, 17, 65). As Huntjens et al. (14) states, water 
diplomacy brings together all state and non-state actors. Track I actors, such as ministries 
and government officials are already well established, but track II and III actors, such as 
conflict resolution professionals, NGOs and businesses can play an increasingly important 
role in the future as the demand for international water management and governance grows 
(17, 33). External actors, such as UN agencies and other international organisations help 
establish an enabling environment for water diplomacy (65).  
 
The need to engage foreign policy makers is increasingly recognized as their interest can be 
beneficial for all actors involved (18, 65). In some settings, cooperation over shared water 
resources is hindered by a volatile political climate. In this case, the escalating political sit-
uation leads to tensions and conflict despite a possibly well-functioning water cooperation 
system. Conversely water cooperation can be too non-political, in which case focus is solely 
on physical and technical aspects of shared water resources, neglecting and even hiding po-
litical tensions. According to Keskinen et al. (3) introducing water diplomacy measures often 
consists of two mutually supplementary aspects, bringing water into diplomacy and diplo-
macy into water cooperation: 
 
• Bringing water into diplomacy consists of bringing information on water and related 
natural resources to be a part of geopolitics and diplomacy, with the aim of increased 
and shared understanding of the state of water resources and possible future changes 
(3).  
• Bringing diplomacy into water cooperation concentrates on the political aspects of 
water use and water cooperation with the aim of solving water related tensions with 
diplomatic tools, such as negotiations and mediation mechanisms (3, 4). 
 
At its best, proactive peace mediation through water diplomacy builds upon cooperation, 
where diplomats gain information and understanding on water related issues and water ex-
perts gain understanding on geopolitic realities and possible solutions through diplomacy 
and peace mediation (3, 18). This increased interest from foreign policy officials improves 
and intensifies water resources cooperation, while successful water governance advances 
foreign policy objectives (1, 18). 
 
Water diplomacy promises a dynamic way to uphold water cooperation and ease water re-
lated tension (70). Its significance will continue to rise as demographic and climatic mega-
trends lead to intensified global water challenges (1). 
2.4 Global water challenges 
Megatrends are global, long-term phenomena which have fundamental implications on the 
economy, society, culture, environment and human lives. Climate change, population 
growth and urbanization are examples of such megatrends that are contributing to global 
water challenges such as increased water scarcity (14). Water diplomacy is often promoted 
as a strategy for mitigating and resolving these challenges (71). 
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The global water situation is getting increasingly worse due to the effects of human induced 
climate change on the Earth’s conditions (1, 14). These effects include rising temperatures, 
sea level rise, shrinking of arctic ice cover, changing crop yields, seasonal climatic changes 
and a growing occurrence of extreme weather events (58, 72). Climate change can exacer-
bate conflict by making food systems more fragile, slowing economic growth, increasing 
human health issues, causing mass emigration as well as weakening infrastructures (72). The 
effects are global and all-encompassing, with weaker economies and societies being more 
susceptible to the effects (65, 72). 
 
Climate change will have severe consequences on fresh water availability globally, with a 
majority of the effects focused on already water stressed areas (Figure 5) (12). 
According to the UN, world population is expected to increase from 7.3 billion people (2015) 
to 8.5 billion by 2030 and 9.6 billion by 2050 (73). Africa has the highest population growth 
rate and it is expected to account for more than half of the world’s population by 2050 (73). 
Increased life expectancy and reduced child mortality is being countered by lower fertility 
rates in other parts of the world (73). Population growth also fuels urbanization. By 2050 an 
expected 68% of the world’s population will live in urban areas compared to 55% in 2018 
(74). 
 
The increase in population and the resulting concentration of people into cities leads to in-
creased domestic, agricultural and industrial water use as well as water pollution (14). Cou-
pled with the effects of climate change, the results will be dire. The amount of people living 
in water scarce areas has increased from 0.24 billion in 1900 to 3.8 billion in 2000, with 
water consumption quadrupling during the same study period (75). The UN World Water 
Development predicts that by 2050 between 4.8 and 5.7 billion people will be living in water 
scarcity (76). 
 
Physical water scarcity means that the water resources of a certain area are not sufficient 
enough to answer the needs, meaning that demand should be reduced or supply increased 
(13). It is studied on different levels and it can be divided into two categories: water stress 
Figure 5: Changes in water availability (12) 
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and water shortage (13). Water stress deals with demand-driven scarcity as the impacts are 
due to high consumption relative to availability (75). Even a small population can experience 
water stress, if water use is sufficiently high and water availability low. Water shortage on 
the other hand is driven mostly by population as its impacts are due to low availability per 
capita (75). Water shortages occur when water availability is sufficiently low and the popu-
lation sufficiently high. 
 
Global water challenges are difficult to tackle due to their scale, urgency and complexity 
(46). In addition to the aforementioned physical water scarcity there are several other aspects 
that create tensions related to diversity in society and environment (55). For example, in 
Central Asia climate change is melting glaciers that feed the great rivers of the region (77). 
This leads to tensions as seasonal fluctuations in water availability create problems for the 
water intensive agriculture in the region (16). Additional problems include the effects of 
increased water use in upstream countries and salinization and soil degradation caused by 
extensive irrigation and fertilizer use  (77, 78). Societal issues such as poverty, unemploy-
ment, inequality, corruption and historical or religious tensions deepen the divide between 
stakeholders making it increasingly difficult to find solutions (46). 
 
In order to identify solutions for these complex global challenges, it is crucial to recognise 
that there is no easy way out. An adaptive approach is needed which considers the physical 
aspects of water as well as its societal, economic and climactic connections (46, 54). Meth-
ods such as open access data, third party cooperation and knowledge sharing could prove to 
be useful tools in the future (18, 46, 63). 
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3 Methodology 
 
This study initially utilized three research methods to collect and analyse data: literature 
reviews, workshops and collecting comments from experts (Phase I). As the analytical 
framework evolved, new methods were applied in the form of co-writing, scenario thinking 
and quantitative analysis (Phase II). Finally, the case studies were used to test and finish the 
analytical framework by providing a practical context for the analysis (Phase III). The meth-
ods are illustrated in Figure 6. 
All of the aforementioned methods were utilized in the work for the water diplomacy report 
and therefore also throughout the thesis process to establish and review the analytical frame-
work (6). A short summary of the methods is presented below. 
3.1 Phase I: Building the foundation 
Literature review 
Literature review was utilized continuously throughout the entire study. First to provide con-
text for water diplomacy, then to define the research objectives and gaps, and to investigate 
the case study regions and relevant analysis methods, and finally when discussing the key 
findings of the work. The literature review of water diplomacy was separated into two dis-
tinct perspectives: water cooperation as well as security and diplomacy. 
 
Most of the literature used was either searched with key words from publication databases 
or suggested by the supervisor and advisors of the thesis. Additional sources were identified 
from the bibliographies of relevant works. Information related to the case study regions was 
provided through literature suggestions from experts. All of the recommendations helped in 
reducing the time needed for the analysis, as there is a vast amount of related literature avail-
able. 
 
The literature analysis was also used to identify possible sources of data for the case study 
regions. The most important data sources were the World Bank, the UN, the Water Scarcity 
Atlas and Transparency International. The Water Scarcity Atlas has been created at Aalto 
University and was used to investigate future water scarcity development with help from 
Joseph Guillaume from the Water and Development Research Group (WDRG) as it allows 
interactive future visualizations, based on different scenarios (13). 
Methods
PHASE I
Literature review
Workshops & Seminar
Expert comments
PHASE II
Co-writing
Scenario process
Quantitative analysis
PHASE III
Testing with case 
studies
Establishing the analytical framework
Figure 6: Methods for establishing the analytical framework 
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Workshops 
Several workshops were held during the water diplomacy analysis done for the MFA and 
they therefore also formed a key part of this thesis. The foundation of the analysis was cre-
ated in the first workshop, where the possible case study regions were identified. Two work-
shops were also held with the steering group for the Water Diplomacy project, which helped 
to define the objectives and scope of the analytical approach. Several meetings with the main 
contributors were held around and between workshops. 
 
The first workshop took place at Aalto University, with the objective of determining case 
study regions for the water diplomacy analysis done for the MFA. The workshop was 
planned and facilitated by Marko Keskinen and Erik Salminen, i.e. the supervisor and author 
of this thesis. The workshop was divided into three parts: i) introduction to water diplomacy 
and context ii) introduction of the possible case study regions based on an inquiry preceding 
the workshop iii) group discussion on the possible regions and finally iv) selection of a short 
list of possible areas based on the discussions. The short list was then handed to the MFA, 
where the final case study regions of Central Asia and Iraq were chosen internally. The 
workshop was hosted by Aalto University, the MFA and the University of Eastern Finland 
(UEF) and attended by several key stakeholders (see Phase III). 
 
The workshops and steering group meetings were important in gaining feedback and nar-
rowing down the scale of the study. They also helped establish a network of interested par-
ties, that provided valuable information on the case study regions. 
 
The water diplomacy report and its findings were discussed in a final seminar at the Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) on 14th of March 2019. The seminar was co-organ-
ised by Aalto University, UEF, MFA & FIIA, and attended by over 60 participants from 
different fields, whom all received the latest version of the water diplomacy report one week 
prior to the seminar. The seminar was chaired by senior development advisor Antti Rau-
tavaara and opened by Elina Kalkku, undersecretary for development policy, both from the 
MFA. After presenting the results from the water diplomacy report the presenters and at-
tendees proceeded to discuss the findings and possible future steps for water diplomacy in 
Finland. Some final feedback regarding the analytical framework, the scenario process and 
the project in general was also received. 
 
Expert comments 
The aforementioned network of experts provided an opportunity to obtain feedback on the 
analytical framework and case studies during the whole writing process. The culmination of 
this method was the comment round for the water diplomacy report draft, set at the second 
steering group meeting. The comment period lasted from 1.2.2019 to 22.2.2019 and provided 
comments from representatives of the MFA, Ministry of Environment, Finnish Environment 
Institute and FIIA. 
 
Potential commentators were chosen based on interest in the workshops, suggestions by 
workshop participants as well as known expertise on water cooperation, diplomacy and the 
case study regions. Due to time constraints and the fact that the report was written in Finnish, 
only Finnish-language experts were consulted, but future plans include the inclusion of local 
expertise. The commentators were sent an email explaining the objectives and background 
   
 16 
of the analysis. When requesting comments, emphasis was put on the functionality, posi-
tives, negatives and possible improvements for the analytical framework as well as more 
specific feedback on the case studies. 
 
Antti Rautavaara, who was also the main counterpart from the MFA for the project, assisted 
in obtaining a policy-related perspective for the analysis while acting as a second advisor for 
the thesis. His insight and range of contacts in the ministry and beyond were a valuable 
resource for the analysis. 
3.2 Phase II: Strengthening the structure 
Co-writing 
The writing of the water diplomacy report was shared between UEF and Aalto University. 
The purpose of this cooperation was to utilize the respective areas of expertise of the two 
universities to their full potential. The WDRG at Aalto has a strong foundation in water 
governance and integrated water resources management, while UEF specializes in environ-
mental law. Combining these two faculties brought a valuable addition of multidisciplinary 
processes to the project. 
 
Senior lecturer Tuula Honkonen and professor Antti Belinskij from UEF were responsible 
for the legal analysis in the report while senior lecturer Marko Keskinen from Aalto Univer-
sity contributed heavily to the establishment of the analytical framework and provided com-
ments and feedback throughout the report and thesis process. Joseph Guillaume from Aalto 
University provided the quantitative analysis with the Water Scarcity Atlas. Some of the 
material written by Antti Belinskij, Tuula Honkonen, Marko Keskinen and Joseph Guil-
laume has been translated and used in the case study sections of this thesis. 
 
Scenario thinking 
An important part of the analytical approach is the creation of future Conflict Paths for the 
case study regions with the help of scenario thinking, using a timeframe until 2030. IPCC 
defines a scenario as a coherent, internally consistent and plausible description of a possible 
future state of the world. It is not a forecast; rather, each scenario is one alternative image 
of how the future can unfold (79). 
 
Analysing the future is challenging, as the results of, for example, climate change, techno-
logical advancements and socio-economic changes are difficult to foresee. Additionally, 
both of the case study regions are large and have a complex political atmosphere and the 
timeframe is significant. Due to these reasons, the Conflict Paths were created by using the 
multiple plausible scenarios method instead of concentrating on a static one-sided approach 
(80). 
 
The basis of multiple plausible scenarios is to create many flexible strategies, that have been 
tailor-made for different global circumstances and represent plausible developments with 
different presumptions (Figure 7). When for example the knowledge regarding a certain re-
gion increases, the strategy can be easily changed during the planned timeframe. By them-
selves the multiple strategies might seem weak, but as knowledge regarding the region in-
creases, the strategies are combined to complement each other and thus represent realized 
development (80). 
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Quantitative analysis 
The main method for quantitative analysis in this thesis is the Water Scarcity Atlas. The 
Atlas is essentially an interactive website developed and maintained by the WRDG at Aalto 
University, and it provides information on global water scarcity, how it has changed in the 
past and how it is predicted to develop in the future (13). 
 
Future water scarcity was investigated by Joseph Guillaume from the WDRG using the At-
las, which allows interactive visualization of possible future scenarios for water use and 
availability, based on modelled estimates from the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Inter-com-
parison Project (ISIMIP) (81). 
 
The socio-economic scenarios include changes in domestic and industrial water use quanti-
fied with the Water Futures and Solutions program by the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) (82). The scenarios are based on Shared Socio-economic Path-
ways (SSP), developed by the IPCC. The SSPs are a set of five different socio-economic 
scenarios, that explore the effects of societal choices on greenhouse gas emissions and cli-
mate change. The SSPs are designed to complement RCPs, which purposely lack socio-
economic aspects, rather concentrating on the possible amount of warming (83). They con-
tain five different narratives, which allow researchers to predict how the world would look 
without climate policy in order to identify barriers and opportunities for climate mitigation 
and adaptation (84). The scenarios in the analysis respectively correspond to “Sustainabil-
ity”, “Middle of the road” and “Regional rivalry”. The visualizations from the Atlas will be 
presented in the Case Study section. 
3.3 Phase III: Case study analysis 
Case studies 
Case studies were used to bring the different methods together and test the analytical frame-
work in selected case study analyses. The use of case studies was crucial for the establish-
ment of the analytical framework as they can be used to understand complex social phenom-
ena, such as life cycles, organizational processes and international relations. Case studies are 
preferred when the focus is on contemporary real-life events and when the investigator has 
little control over them (85). Both of these criteria are present in the study. 
 
As mentioned before, the case study regions of Central Asia and Iraq were chosen for this 
study. Two distinct cases were chosen to provide meaningful insight into the contrasting 
situations of the two regions (theoretical replication). Additionally, the evidence from mul-
Figure 7: Differences between a static approach and an adaptive approach (80) 
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tiple cases is often viewed as more compelling and robust, which is important in the estab-
lishment of a novel analytical framework (85). Representatives from a wide variety of stake-
holders, such as the MFA, FIIA, the Finnish Ministry of Environment, the Finnish Environ-
ment Institute Aalto University, UEF and Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) were present 
in the workshop for choosing the case study regions. The case studies proved an invaluable 
asset in the testing and development of the established analytical framework. 
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4 Establishing an Analytical Framework for Water Diplo-
macy 
 
In this chapter the analytical framework for water diplomacy is established through the study 
of water diplomacy, establishment of a simplified scenario process as well as through iden-
tifying and formulating key elements for a water diplomacy analytical framework. The work 
is based on the water diplomacy report created for the MFA (6). 
4.1 Setting the stage for water diplomacy analysis 
A well-coordinated water diplomacy approach makes it possible to prevent internal and ex-
ternal conflicts by building capacity and reliable networks between actors and by identifying 
solutions to water related conflict situations through diplomatic tools and technical 
knowledge on water resources (4, 17, 69). In order to establish a functioning analytical 
framework, the following aspects were identified to be investigated: the current state of the 
regions and nations as well as their possible futures in regard to trends and possible water 
diplomacy actions. The Water Diplomacy Framework, created by Islam and Susskind (63) 
was an important basis for the establishment of this finer scale analytical framework as it 
addresses the complexity and interdisciplinarity of water challenges. 
 
By making use of the findings of Wouters (51) and Genderen and Rood (17), namely regard-
ing the levels of water security: local, national and international, and water diplomacy: bi-
lateral, multilateral and basin wide, respectively, it was possible to identify relevant geo-
graphical scales for this analysis. The identified scales are as follows: 
 
• Regional (several countries and water bodies, e.g. EU, Central Asia, East-Africa) 
• Transboundary water (shared by several states, such as the Mekong river) 
• Bilateral (two countries and one or more shared water body) 
• National (different uses of water in one or more water bodies) 
 
Especially the inclusion of a national scale of water diplomacy can be seen as a novelty, as 
the most often cited lowest level of water diplomacy is bilateral. In this analysis, the national 
level was a crucial addition, as the Iraq case study focused on a single nation. All of the 
aforementioned scales are guided by the international framework for water diplomacy. 
 
Aided by previous research and definitions, the following definition for multi-track water 
diplomacy was created to assist in the analysis: “Water diplomacy is a process that pro-
vides means to prevent and mitigate water-related political tensions by making simultaneous 
use of water know-how and diplomatic tools and mechanisms. In this way, water diplomacy 
complements water cooperation through its focus on the ‘political’ and acknowledgement of 
the differing interests of relevant actors.” (6). 
 
Previous studies on water diplomacy have focused on identifying potential hydro-political 
hotspots on a global scale (1, 66). As this study concentrated on regional and national con-
texts, a new scope was required to understand the current situation in the case study regions, 
with an emphasis on societal context (63). In order to satisfy relevant security, diplomacy 
and water aspects, the following three themes were chosen for a more detailed analysis of 
the current state of the case study regions: 
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• Society and politics 
• Water and climate change 
• Law and cooperative mechanisms 
 
Futures research was also required to understand the implications of the current state analysis 
and effects of regional and global megatrends. Additionally, it can be used to identify starting 
points for regional or national tensions. While it is impossible to predict accurate future 
events, systematic futures research can provide relevant information for decision-making 
(80,86). A simplified scenario process was utilized in this analysis, which is studied in closer 
detail in the following chapter. 
 
In order to identify possible water diplomacy actions, the scenario process was coupled with 
a study of the so-called water diplomacy toolkit, which includes different tools and mecha-
nisms for water diplomacy. Water diplomacy is about applying diplomatic instruments to-
gether with technical ones used in water cooperation and transboundary water management 
(4). These instruments include negotiations, dispute-resolution mechanisms, the establish-
ment of consultation platforms and the organization of joint fact-finding missions (4, 69). 
The concept of integrative diplomacy is crucial for the analysis as it highlights the different 
dimensions of modern diplomatic challenges and the need for collaborative relationships in 
solving these issues (45). 
4.2 Using scenario thinking to recognize conflict paths 
A simplified scenario process was utilized to create two Conflict Paths for both of the case 
study regions. The scenario process was inspired partly by the multiple plausible futures 
approach that creates alternative scenarios with the help of predictive, explorative and nor-
mative methods (80). These three methods can be linked to the three steps in the following 
manner: 
 
● predictive: current state and megatrend analyses (what will happen?)  
● explorative: Conflict Paths (what could happen?) 
● normative: possible actions (how can a specific target be met?) 
 
The multiple plausible scenarios method functions well for the purpose of this analytical 
framework, as the future in the regions during the timeframe is unclear and the probability 
of needing flexible solutions is high (80, 86). The predictive approach is built through com-
mon trends and “what if” scenarios, while in the explorative approach longer time frames 
and different angles are compared with the “what if” scenarios. The Normative approach 
was utilized in creation of the suggested measures of the report as it consists of steps or 
actions that are needed in order to meet objectives or desired futures. 
 
Every conflict is unique and has its own context, which is why it would be impossible to 
effectively create multiple contingency plans with a single static approach (80, 87). This led 
to the decision to specifically create multiple undesirable Conflict Paths for this analysis in 
order to identify root causes of conflict in the case study regions and to recognise possible 
water diplomacy actions (87). 
 
The logic of establishing the Conflict Paths and related water diplomacy actions is presented 
in Figure 8. In Conflict Path A, a conflict escalates through water-related tensions (i.e. water 
getting to politics), while in Conflict Path B the political tensions make water use political 
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(3). Similarly, water diplomacy actions are then either water-related i.e. linked to increased 
water understanding (A) or diplomacy-related i.e. utilisation of diplomatic tools and mech-
anisms also in water cooperation (B) (3). The timeframe of the conflict paths and actions is 
set to 2030 to provide long enough timeframe and also correspond with the deadline of the 
UN SDGs (19). 
 
Together these actions form a possible 
water diplomacy strategy for the case 
study regions, which aims to bring the 
paths back towards peace and coopera-
tion. As with the conflict paths, the possi-
ble actions are divided into two catego-
ries: measures that bring water related 
know-how to the political table (A) and 
measures that strengthen political cooper-
ation and the use of diplomatic tools in 
water related cases (B). The proposed ac-
tions are mainly supporting or strengthen-
ing measures that build upon existing in-
vestments and projects, but they can also 
include completely novel ideas. 
 
Concentrating on Conflict Paths instead of just general future paths provided the opportunity 
to assess water diplomacy potential for the regions, as potential disagreements and conflicts 
are the basis of the need for water diplomacy (4). The possible water diplomacy actions are 
formed by analysing the results from the current state and Conflict Paths. The aim of the 
actions is to be traceable to key points in the conflict paths, so that there is a clear connection 
to the root causes of the problems (87). 
4.3 Analytical framework for water diplomacy 
After identifying the three key steps: current state, conflict paths and possible actions, it was 
time to establish the analytical framework for water diplomacy. The main objectives of an-
alytical frameworks, as identified by Cai (88), were used to steer the framework: 
 
i) Current state and conflict paths 
→ Advances understanding 
ii) A systematic framework 
→ Makes it easier to compare studies and possibly develop synergies between 
them 
iii) Possible actions 
→ Help policy-makers and other practitioners to find and develop innovative so-
lutions to challenges  
 
Water 
related 
tensions
Political 
tensions
B. Utilising 
diplomatic tools
A. Water facts 
to the political 
table
WATER 
CONFLICT
WATER 
DIPLOMACY
PEACE AND 
COOPERATION
CONFLICT 
PATH B
CONFLICT 
PATH A
Figure 8: Creating Conflict Paths (6) 
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The structure of the analytical framework is as follows (Figure 9): first the regions are in-
vestigated with a current state analysis (1st step), which is divided into three themes: society 
and politics, water and climate change as well as law and cooperative mechanisms. Through 
this analysis two possible Conflict Paths are created with a simplified scenario process and 
megatrend analysis (2nd step). Finally, the two Conflict Paths coupled with the current state 
and megatrend analyses are used to identify possible water diplomacy actions that can be 
used to prevent and mitigate potential conflicts (3rd step). Many of the methods used in this 
thesis (See Methodology section) became an integral part of the analytical framework. 
 
The current state and Conflict Paths represent a problem-based approach, while the possible 
actions step is an example of a solution-based approach (80). The methodology of each step 
is also explained in the above picture, including certain suggestion for the future, that could 
not be implemented due to time constraints. For example, in future analyses it would be 
beneficial to include local experts from the case study regions in the workshop process both 
for the analysis of the current state and the Conflict Paths. These suggestions are explored 
in greater detail in the Discussion section. 
 
Different criteria, such as key components for water and post-conflict peacekeeping stated 
by Weinthal et al. (89) and summarized by Crawford et al. (90), were used to help identify 
the possible water diplomacy actions. These components include: 
 
1. Involve stakeholders in decision making. 
2. Prioritize, sequence, and coordinate water interventions. 
3. Invest in resilient infrastructure and adaptive management. 
4. Assess institutions and rebuild capacities for water governance. 
5. Engage the informal sector. 
6. Use water as a platform for cooperation and confidence building. 
 
The final Conflict Paths and suggested water diplomacy actions were conceived with the 
case study analyses as they provided the needed regional and national context. It should be 
highlighted, that the recognized actions are indicative only as they provide just the authors’ 
view building on the current state analysis and Conflict Paths. 
Figure 9: Analytical framework for water diplomacy 
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4.4 Testing the analytical framework with case studies 
The objective of the case study analysis was, firstly, to test the developed analytical frame-
work, and secondly to identify opportunities for water diplomacy to advance proactive peace 
mediation in the chosen regions. The structure of the analyses is based on the analytical 
framework consisting of the following steps: current state, Conflict Paths and possible ac-
tions. 
 
Two case study regions, Central Asia and Iraq, were chosen for the water diplomacy report 
commissioned by the MFA, which were also utilized in this thesis (6). Central Asia was 
chosen to represent a familiar context for Finnish foreign and development policy, while the 
Iraq case study represented an emerging context (90). Additionally, the Central Asia case 
study provided a regional context for the analysis, while the Iraq case study concentrated on 
a single state and its foreign relations. 
 
The original case study analyses for the water diplomacy report were written together by 
four report authors, with the author of this thesis having the main responsibility for the anal-
ysis. The analytical framework was created together with senior lecturer Marko Keskinen 
from Aalto University while the legal analysis was written mainly by senior lecturer Tuula 
Honkonen and professor Antti Belinskij from UEF. Joseph Guillaume from Aalto University 
carried out the Water Scarcity Atlas future predictions. In this thesis the text on case studies 
has been translated from the Finnish language report and modified by the author to function 
with the focus of this thesis. Especially the section “Current state: law and cooperative mech-
anisms” still largely represents the text from the report by the aforementioned authors. 
 
As the focus of this thesis is on the analytical framework itself rather than the case study 
results, only the Central Asia case study will be covered in full. The main findings from the 
Iraq case study can be found in Appendix I, while the discussion on its results can be found 
in the Discussion section.  
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5 Case Study: Central Asia 
 
Central Asia is located on the crossroads of the ancient silk road and is in this study seen to 
consist of five former Soviet Socialist Republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan (officially the 
Kyrgyz Republic), Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Soviet legacy is still 
strongly present in over-extraction of water for the sake of agriculture and gigantic infra-
structure projects (91). Ethnic borders and environmental realities have been long disre-
garded leading to regional tensions and environmental catastrophes such as the drying of the 
Aral Sea (77, 91–93). 
 
Dry climactic conditions are prevalent in Central Asia as scarce precipitation has highlighted 
the dependence on the two major regional rivers: Amu Darya and Syr Darya (77). Natural 
resources are divided very unevenly which has created and continues to create tensions (16). 
Regional water treaties and organisations are outdated or lacking in mandate. 
 
The War in Afghanistan complicates the security situation in Central Asia (94). Additionally, 
several combatants have left the region to join extremist organisations such as the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) while international organisations continue to criticise the au-
thoritarian and nationalist governments of human rights and freedom of speech violations as 
well as corruption (94, 95). Climate change is expected to increase glacial melting, create 
fluctuations in seasonal water flow as well as lead to stronger and more frequent extreme 
weather events (16, 77, 96).  
 
Sustainable and equitable water use and pre-emptive water diplomacy are important tools 
for peace as the effects of population growth and climate change lead to wide-spread issues. 
5.1 Current state 
Society and politics 
 Central Asia is located in a geopolitically important intersection between Russia in the 
North, China in the East, Afghanistan and Iran in the South and the Caspian Sea and Europe 
in the West (Figure 10). Uzbekistan has the largest population (32.4 million) while Kazakh-
stan is the largest and most economically stable of the states. A majority of the population 
lives by the mountain ranges and in fertile river valleys while the great plains and deserts of 
Kazakhstan, Western Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are scarcely populated. Fergana Valley, 
• The population of Central Asia is divided unevenly due to harsh climate conditions 
and uneven water availability. Fergana valley is the population center of the region. 
• The economies are based on agriculture, industry and mining. Natural resources 
(especially fossil fuels) are unevenly distributed between downstream and up-
stream countries leading to economic disparities. 
• All of the Central Asian countries have been classified as fragile. The security sit-
uation is aggravated by illegal drug trade, human trafficking, extremism and the 
nearby War in Afghanistan. 
• Central Asia is located in a geopolitically important intersection, with differing 
interest from China, Russia and the USA. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
has been of regional importance lately. 
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situated between Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan is the population centre of the 
region (97). Information on Central Asian 
states is shown in Table 1. 
 
The population growth rate has been rising 
steadily in Central Asia since the latter half of 
the 20th century due to high birth rates and ad-
vancements in health care. In 1960 the popu-
lation of the whole region was 24 million, 
when in 2017 it has already surpassed 71 mil-
lion (98). The urbanization levels differ 
greatly between states, for example in Ta-
dzhikistan it is only 25% while in Kazakhstan 
it is almost 60% (99). The five biggest ethnic groups are in descending order: Uzbeks, Ka-
zakhs, Tajiks, Turkmens and Kyrgyz. All of the languages are Turkish in origin, except for 
Tajik, which is based on Persian. Islam is the prevalent religion with most of the population 
being Sunni Muslim.  
 
Table 1: Information on Central Asian states (97) 
 
Since independence, Central Asian countries have chosen their individual pathways for eco-
nomic development. Uzbekistan is focusing on a step by step transition into a market econ-
omy while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are attempting market reforms as foreign trade net-
works are lacking (100). Kazakhstan has the highest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 
region (9030 USD per capita) while Tajikistan is still one of the poorest states in all of Asia 
(801 USD per capita) despite several attempts to diversify its economy (99). Turkmenistan 
is showing no interest in transforming to a market economy (100). 
 
The economies of Central Asia are based on irrigation intensive agriculture, light and heavy 
industry and mining. During the Soviet era, the region provided most of the country’s cotton 
and was an important producer of coal and other industrial minerals (101). Water intensive 
cotton production is still dominant, especially in Uzbekistan, where it constitutes around 
10% of the country’s exports (102). Fossil fuel take up the biggest share of exports in Ka-
zakhstan and Turkmenistan (77). 
 
State Capital City 
Population  
(2017) 
Land area  
(km2) 
 Kazakhstan Astana 18 049 000 2 724 900 
 Kyrgyzstan Bishkek 6 211 000 199 945 
 Tadzhikistan Dushanbe 8 840 000 143 100 
 Turkmenistan Ashgabat 5 503 000 491 210 
 Uzbekistan Tashkent 32 422 000 447 400 
 Total 71 025 000 4 006 555 
Figure 10: Central Asia (16) 
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Income distribution in Central Asian states is quite equal according to the Gini coefficient 
(27–40; 27 in Finland). On the other hand, economic opportunities are much more restricted 
than in Europe and millions of workers have left the region to find higher paying work in 
countries such as Russia, Turkey and Korea (103). Salaries sent home by these workers are 
a major part of the GDP in some of the countries: 12% in Uzbekistan and 50% in Tajikistan 
(highest in the world) (104). 
 
Energy security is a major cause of tension in the region, with downstream countries losing 
interest in selling their fuel and energy to upstream neighbours, when foreign energy com-
panies are willing to pay more (77). For example, a trilateral energy treaty signed in 1998 
broke down after just a year when Kazakhstan refused to deliver coal to Kyrgyzstan (105). 
The Kyrgyz government retaliated by cutting of the flow from its reservoirs (77). In 2009 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan withdrew from the regional power grid leaving the upstream 
states in a catastrophic energy crisis in the middle of a harsh winter (106). 
 
The governments of Central Asian states can be defined 
as authoritarian with the exception of Kyrgyzstan. Fig-
ure 11 showcases a map of resilience in a global study 
by Varis et al. (57) that combines three indexes: good 
governance, GDP and Human Development Index 
(HDI). Central Asia is coloured yellow in the map, 
which corresponds to below average resilience. 
 
In recent years all of the Central Asian states have been 
classified as fragile based on the state’s ability to govern 
their territory, offer public services and maintain legal institutions (107). Fragility has in-
creased during the last decade. World Bank governance indicators place Central Asian states 
low on good governance indexes (Table 2) (16). 
 
 
Table 2: Governance indicators (16, 108) 
Governance In-
dicators (World 
Bank) 
Political 
Stability 
(max. 100) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(max. 100) 
Rule of Law 
(max. 100) 
Voice and Ac-
countability 
(max. 100) 
Corruptions 
Perceptions In-
dex 2018 (108) 
Kazakhstan 45 54 38 14 124 / 180 
Kyrgyzstan 30 23 17 33 132 / 180 
Tajikistan 22 13 8 5 152 / 180 
Turkmenistan 40 10 6 1 161 / 180 
Uzbekistan 35 33 11 3 158 / 180 
 
 
Figure 11: Resilience in Central Asia 
(57) 
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Regional cooperation has been hindered by individual states focusing on sustaining their 
political regimes and increasing nationalist sentiments (16). State leaders generally stay in 
power for life or name their own successors (104). Kyrgyzstan is the exception as revolutions 
in 2005 and 2010 have contributed to changes in the regime (109). Administrative institu-
tions are centralised and inflexible while regional institutions are so weak that they cannot 
respond to tensions (77). 
 
Since 2016, the situation has showed signs of improvement due to the inauguration of the 
liberal Uzbek president Shavkat Mirziyonev. As a result, Uzbekistan has signed border trea-
ties with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and improved infrastructure between the states (110). 
Uzbekistan has also ceased to protest the proposed large hydropower projects in the upstream 
countries and even shown interest in economic cooperation (111). This development could 
have large-scale ramifications for the region as Uzbekistan is geographically central, sharing 
borders with all of the other countries in the region (77). 
 
In March 2019 the long-standing president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev announced 
his decision to step down (112). Critics note that his decision to relinquish power willingly 
during a time of public protests against his reign gives him the chance to continue to play a 
substantial role in the country’s politics (112). In June 2019, the selected successor of Naz-
arbayev was elected amidst protests (113). 
 
The critical regional threats in Central Asia are the War in Afghanistan, drug and human 
trafficking as well as the rise of extremist movements (16). Drug trafficking is closely linked 
with government corruption, while ISIS recruitment has led to an increase in human traf-
ficking (92, 93, 114). Some militants have left the region to fight elsewhere but others have 
stayed and carried out attacks, such as in Aktobe, Kazakhstan in 2016 (95). 
 
Due to its geopolitically important location, Central Asia has received special interest from 
major powers such as China, Russia and the USA. In the past, the security discussion cen-
tered on the War in Afghanistan but recently foreign nations have shown interest in the eco-
nomic opportunities, natural resources (especially oil and gas) and strategic location (115). 
 
Currently China is the most active in Central Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
which aims to develop trade and infrastructure networks that connect Asia to Europe and 
Africa (116). China has invested heavily in the regions rail and road networks as well as 
energy production through bilateral treaties, which might lead to regional tensions if China 
decides to favour some states over others (117). Russia has a competing cooperative organ-
ization the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which has been joined by Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan while the USA aims to utilise its substantial economic assets to gain control of 
the regions natural resources (118). 
 
The border between China and Kazakhstan is geopolitically interesting as a majority of the 
Kazakh water resources flow from China through the Ili and Irtysh rivers (77). Despite ag-
ricultural developments on both sides, cooperation has so far been productive which reflects 
on their dependence on each other: China is an important investor in the Kazakh energy 
sector while Kazakhstan is an important partner in China’s BRI scheme (77, 119). 
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Water resources and climate change 
 
Central Asia is a vast geographically varied region which contains mountain ranges, deserts, 
grass plains, glaciers and fertile river valleys (96). Approximately 60% of the region consists 
of deserts, largest of which are the Karakum in Turkmenistan and the Kyzylkum in Western 
Uzbekistan. Irrigation from the major rivers of Amu Darya and Syr Darya make agriculture 
possible in large parts of the desert regions (77, 97). 
 
Dry climatic conditions and erratic rainfall patterns are typical in Central Asia with most of 
the precipitation falling in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In the summer temperatures can rise 
to over 50 °C while in the winter they drop to under -45 °C (16). Uneven water distribution 
has led to large population centres being situated close to water as in Fergana Valley (97). 
 
The largest water resources in the region are the Amu Darya (Afghanistan–Tajikistan–Turk-
menistan–Uzbekistan) and Syr Darya (Kyrgyzstan–Tajikistan–Uzbekistan–Kazakhstan) 
Rivers (77). Amu Darya originates from the Pamir Mountains in Tajikistan and Syr Darya 
from the Tien Shan mountain range in Kyrgyzstan (77). Together their basin areas hold 90% 
of the region’s river water, 80% of the population and 37% of the land area (77). Both of the 
rivers flowed into the Aral Sea before a large part of it dried up. Other important basin areas 
are the Balkhash-Alakol, Ob-Irtysh and Ural (Figure 13) (77). 
 
In addition to the aforementioned large rivers, Central Asia is host to numerous small but 
important transboundary rivers especially in the Fergana Valley (16). Due to Soviet-era 
boundaries, the rivers and 
irrigation channels flow 
back and forth between 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan creating ten-
sions between different 
ethnic groups (16, 120). 
State boundaries have long 
been largely undefined in 
the region leading to fur-
ther confusion and con-
flicts (16, 77). 
 
• The Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins contain 37% of the area and 80% of 
the population of Central Asia. There are numerous small but geopolitically mean-
ingful rivers, which transcend national boundaries. 
• Upstream countries have substantial hydropower potential. Dam projects and their 
effects are crucial to the stability and security of the region (e.g. Rogun Dam). 
• Water intensive agriculture such as cotton production have led to the drying of the 
Aral Sea as well as extensive soil degradation and salinization. 
• Due to climate change, the crucial glaciers of the region are in danger of melting, 
which could endanger water availability and food security throughout the region. 
Figure 12: Important basins in Central Asia (77) 
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Water is increasingly connected to the regional economy and politics due to its scarcity (77). 
In mountainous Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hydropower is a vital source of energy and an 
important export while in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan water enables large-scale agricul-
ture (77, 92, 93). 
 
Cultivation of water intensive crops such as cotton and other agricultural products have made 
Central Asia one of the biggest water consumers in the world (Figure 14). According to the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) an area of approximately 100 000 km2 is culti-
vated through irrigation (121). Turkmenistan currently holds the record for highest water use 
in the world per capita: 5952 m3/year. 
The increasing agricultural demand is putting a heavy stress on water resources. According 
to the threshold set by the European Environment Agency, four of the five Central Asian 
states are water stressed (77). The most prominent example of water scarcity is the Aral Sea, 
which has changed from the fourth largest lake in the world to mostly salt flats in a few 
decades (91). Fishing villages and lakeside towns lost their coastlines and livelihoods as the 
growing salinity killed the majority of aquatic life (77). The regional climate has also harsh-
ened due to the loss of a large stabilising body of water (77, 91). In order to ease the situation, 
Kazakhstan has built a dam to contain the water flowing from Syr Darya in the northern 
remnants of the Aral Sea (122). Due to these efforts, water levels have increased, and com-
mercial fishing has been resumed with the expense of increased hostility from Uzbekistan, 
who shares the lake (123). However, the water flowing into the lake is not nearly enough to 
restore it to its original volume (123). 
 
The practice of diverting water from the major rivers for irrigation began during the Soviet 
era in the 1950s (77). The waters from Amu Darya and Syr Darya are extensively diverted 
as seen in Figure 15. When the irrigation water in the canals evaporates it leaves behind salt, 
which in time degrades the soil (77). This problem is aggravated by leaking irrigation chan-
nels, unsustainable water use and weak sewerage (77). In the Karakalpakstan region in Uz-
bekistan where the Amu Darya dries up to 95% of the land is salinized (124). Additionally, 
the surplus irrigation water flows back to the rivers carrying salt, fertilizer and toxins (77). 
Figure 13: Water use in Central Asia (77) 
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In 2000, Turkmenistan published a grandiose project dubbed the Golden Age Lake, pro-
jected to cost 8 billion dollars (125). The objective of the project is to use the runoff water 
from irrigation to create a 100 km long artificial lake with an area of 2000 km2 (125). The 
designers are hoping that the aquatic life in the lake will remove part of the salt so that the 
lake could function not only as a reservoir but as a source of water for surrounding areas. 
Scientists are sceptical about the feasibility of the project (77). 
 
Energy resources are divided unevenly between the Central Asian nations (77). Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have sufficient fossil fuel reserves to fulfil their own energy 
requirements while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have to rely on hydropower and energy ex-
ports (77, 126). There is enormous scope and interest for additional production of hydro-
power as in 2018 Kyrgyzstan utilised only about 10% of its hydropower potential and Ta-
jikistan 5% (127, 128). The interest to increase hydropower production is high as both of the 
states need more electricity especially during the harsh winters (77). 
 
Proposed large-scale hydropower plants are expected to create tensions in the region due to 
their potential disruptions to water flow needed for agriculture in the downstream states (16, 
77). Presently both the Amu Darya and Syr Darya are fed by melting glaciers with peak 
water flow during late spring and summer corresponding with the growing season (77). 
However, this cycle is endangered by the hydropower plans as their greatest need for energy 
is in the winter (126). Additionally, the filling of the reservoir dams takes years and has 
noticeable effects on the river flow. For example, the filling of the Rogun Dam, under con-
struction in Tajikistan, is expected to lower the flow rate of the Amu Darya by 1.3% (129). 
Climate change is accelerating the melting of the glaciers, which could further escalate ten-
sions (16). 
 
Figure 14: Irrigation channels in Central Asia (77) 
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The access to safe drinking water has increased considerably during the last decade, but 
many people, especially in Tajikistan, still lack access (77). The problems are prevalent in 
rural areas, but some bigger cities are also experiencing issues. Constructors aim to exploit 
groundwater resources as its quality is usually higher and availability more secure. Water 
utility construction and maintenance are generally neglected due to a lack of resources, with 
the rising amount of wastewater and soil degradation posing large challenges for the future 
(77). 
 
During the last three decades the average temperature of Central Asia has risen by 0.5 °C 
and the rate is projected to increase in the following years (96). Glaciers are the primary 
source of water for the region’s major rivers, but an estimated quarter of their glacial volume 
has already disappeared, and another quarter is expected to disappear by 2025 (126). Long-
term effects include increased variability of water for the agricultural, human and energy 
needs (16). The World Bank estimates that with the current 1.5% growth rate, water availa-
bility will drop below 1700 m3 by 2050 and below 1000 m3 by 2080 (130). The report also 
estimates significant economic benefits from improving water use trends (77). 
 
In addition to the temperature rise and glacial melting, extreme weather events such as 
droughts will become more common and precipitation patterns will change radically (96). 
The effects will be severe food security as agricultural productivity will suffer due to lowered 
water availability (16, 77). Energy demand will change with changing temperatures and 
storms will create problems for the already weak energy infrastructure (96). 
 
Rogun Dam 
Tajikistan began the construction of the Rogun dam in 2014. When completed it will 
be the highest dam in the world with a height of 335 m. The dam is located in close 
proximity to fault lines, but the World Bank has stated that this should not cause prob-
lems if the dam is built as planned. When completed the dam will generate 3 600 MW 
of electricity which constitutes 80% of the whole country’s current capacity. However, 
the dam is not expected to be completed until 2028, after which it will take several years 
for the reservoir to fill. 
Uzbekistan has been wary of upstream dam projects and their effects on agriculture. In 
2012 the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov threatened Tajikistan with war if the 
Rogun dam project would continue. He denied access of construction equipment to the 
country for years as well as raising the cost and discontinuing gas exports to the up-
stream countries. In 2014 during one such interruption Tajikistan threatened to close a 
water canal leading to Uzbekistan. In 2016, the situation took a turn for the better as the 
new president of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyonev declared his support for the Rogun 
project and even expressed interest in supporting it economically. 
The Rogun dam reservoir will also have social and environmental effects. It will en-
compass an area of approximately 170 km2 submerging 70 villages and forcing the re-
location of about 42 000 people. On the other hand, the dam provides cheap energy to 
inhabitants which might save the nations forests, which are being chopped extensively 
during winter. An estimated 70% of Tajik forests have disappeared due to logging, 
which has increased the threat of landslides. 
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Finland has supported Central Asian water resource management through the FinWaterWEI 
project (131). The objective is to strengthen water security in and around Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan through equitable IWRM. The implementation phase has focused on developing 
water utilities and sanitation and establishing water committees in hard to reach regions 
(131). 
 
Law and cooperative mechanisms 
• Only a few of the Central Asian nations have signed international water treaties. 
Especially the upstream countries are wary of the treaties as they consider them 
biased. 
• Several regional water treaties have been signed, but many of them are outdated 
declaration-like with no concrete results. Some mechanisms have proven to be 
functional. 
• On a national level, the Kyrgyz water law considers water as an economic com-
modity, which means that other nations need to compensate for their share of water 
flowing downstream. 
• There is a clear need for a trusted and efficient regional organisation which spe-
cialises on water cooperation and management. 
 
International water treaties 
Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian nation to sign the UN Water Convention. It remains 
very unlikely that the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan sign the treaty as they 
consider more favourable to their downstream counterparts (26, 30, 132). Kazakhstan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan have signed the UNECE convention. The countries which have not 
signed it are also actively participating in relevant workshops and events. 
 
The UNECE convention on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (1991 Espoo conven-
tion) and the associated proceedings on strategic EIA (2003 Kiev proceedings) are central to 
transboundary water cooperation. The Espoo convention has been signed by Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, but the proceedings have not been signed by any Central Asian state. Addition-
ally, several regional and bilateral water treaties include EIA obligations and in some the 
thresholds are even lower than in the UNECE convention (133). 
 
Regional water treaties 
Regional water treaties have created the foundations for Central Asian cooperation. From a 
legal perspective, these treaties are often simple and declaration-like, but have strengthened 
interstate relations and established cooperative mechanisms (134). 
 
All of the five Central Asian states have signed the Almaty Agreement (1992) on cooperation 
in joint management, use and protection of interstate sources of water resources (135). The 
treaty contains decrees from international water law, such as the obligation not to cause sig-
nificant harm, but omits others such as the principle of equitable use. The Almaty Agreement 
has been criticized for being merely an instrument for maintaining the Soviet era water trea-
ties (136). 
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The agreement led to the establishment of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
(ICWC). It was the first regional institution after independence with the aim of controlling 
regulation, ensuring efficient use and protection of the waters, developing a regional com-
mon water management policy and determining annual limits of water use for each state 
(135). 
  
In 1993, the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) was set up to generate funds 
for the Aral Sea and surrounding areas (135). The objective of IFAS is to ensure, that the 
scarce water resources of the Aral Sea basin are used in a sustainable manner and that the 
regions water quality is maintained at regulation levels. However these targets are not spec-
ified with concrete contractual obligations (136). ICWC was later integrated into IFAS. 
 
A multilateral treaty concerning the coordinated water and energy use inside the Syr Darya 
basin was signed in 1998 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (77). The signatory 
parties are committed to economic and reasonable water use in the region. In concrete terms 
the treaty stipulates that the excess energy generated in upstream countries during the grow-
ing season will be granted to the downstream countries which agree to give a corresponding 
amount of energy or a monetary compensation during the winter to the upstream countries 
(77). In practice the treaty has not functioned effectively (137, 138). 
 
A general agreement on environmental protection to advance sustainable development in 
Central Asia was signed in 2006 and it has so far been ratified by Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan (139). The agreement provides the legal framework for long-term cooperation 
regarding environmental themes such as water protection and sustainable use, but it will only 
step into force when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ratify it. The agreement could create a last-
ing foundation for cooperation through a permanent secretariat and regular meetings. This 
development could reflect beneficially on other cooperative mechanisms in the region. 
 
Bilateral treaties and national law 
Central Asian states have favoured bilateral treaties as instruments of regional cooperation 
for transboundary water resources management. In addition to this, the states have issued 
declarations that touch on shared water resources usually during presidential meetings. In 
March 2018, four Central Asian state leaders (Turkmenistan did not participate) met for the 
first time in years with water cooperation being high on the agenda. The presidents high-
lighted that regional water cooperation should be developed with regard to mutual benefits 
(140). 
 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have signed a bilateral treaty on cooperation over water man-
agement in 1996 (141). The treaty states that the water in Amu Darya is divided equally 
between the two countries. 
 
The bilateral Chu-Talas River Commission was established in 2005 as part of a treaty signed 
by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The commission consults, implements and regulates the 
maintenance and use of questions regarding water control infrastructure. The commission 
and related bilateral treaty are considered successful and a good example of upstream down-
stream cooperation to solve water conflicts. 
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A national law regarding regional water infrastructure use, water resources and water econ-
omy equipment was approved in Kyrgyzstan in 2001 (138). The law considers water as an 
economic commodity which if used by other states should be reimbursed financially. The 
law also allows Kyrgyzstan to cut the flow of water downstream (138).  
 
Regional organisations 
ICWC and IFAS have been responsible for joint management, use and protection of water 
resources since 1997. ICWC decides on regional water policy, composes and accepts annual 
water use quotas and monitors their compliance. IFAS has been working as a higher organ-
isation for cooperation but it has been heavily criticised as being too weak to effectively 
coordinate IWRM (77, 142). 
 
A lack of trust and dissatisfaction with the ICWC water quotas have been a regular mainstay 
in regional water cooperation (77). For example, Kyrgyzstan froze its participation to IFAS 
in 2016 as a protest to its proposed reforms falling through (138). Surprisingly, during the 
first IFAS summit in almost 10 years in 2018 state leaders expressed their interest to rein-
vigorate cooperative and efficient water resources management (143). The summit proved 
that the Central Asian states are interested in raising the prominence of IFAS. 
 
River basin organisations have been established for both Amu Darya and Syr Darya under 
the ICWC (144). These organisations take care of the several questions linked to the practical 
management of the rivers. 
 
In addition, the following organisations are relevant IWRM actors in Central Asia: 
 
• International Water Assessment Center (IWAC) is a relatively new institution, which 
has been working in Kazakhstan since 2017. Its objective is to support the imple-
mentation and application of the UNECE convention on transboundary waters in 
Central Asian states and beyond. 
• UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) was 
established in 2007. Its mission is to identify and deal with existing and emerging 
threats to security in Central Asia. 
• Regional Environmental Centre for Central Asia (CAREC) is a nonaligned interna-
tional organisation, which supports Central Asian states in matters related to the en-
vironment and sustainable development. Water is one of the primary focus points. 
• Interstate Commission for Sustainable Development (ICSD) aims to coordinate and 
monitor regional cooperation on environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment in Central Asia. Their work has connections to regional water management. 
• Regional Water Partnership Network for the Countries of the Caucasus and Central 
Asia (GWP CACENA) has the primary objective of aid the states in solving difficult 
transboundary water related issues and help them develop IWRM in their policies 
and customs. 
• Regional Network of Water (Basin) Organizations from Eastern Europe, Caucasus 
and Central Asia (EECCA WMO) is part of the International Network of Basin Or-
ganisations (INBO). EECCA WMO aims to support the exchange of information, 
knowledge and expertise and develop education and citizen participation on trans-
boundary water management. 
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Summary 
There is a strong need for more intensive cooperation in Central Asia. During the last years, 
the tendency has been that each state aims to solve their water resource problems unilaterally 
(16). This has led to the needs and interests of other basin countries being neglected (96). A 
notable example is the construction of the Rogun dam in Tajikistan, which has threatened to 
escalate into a conflict with Uzbekistan or the Kyrgyz national water law, which can be used 
by the state to approve of exacting tariffs on water use from other states (126, 138). 
 
Central Asian states have created legal frameworks and cooperative mechanisms throughout 
the years but their potential in transboundary water management is not fully exploited. There 
are large differences in the participation, approval and investment on regional cooperation 
of the states, due to geopolitical emphasis and differing national priorities. High level re-
gional water cooperation is happening largely on an ad-hoc basis and concentrates on short-
term challenges and practical problems instead of a universal long-term strategy (137). Reg-
ular meetings between the states, clarification on the international legal system and interna-
tional aid are needed to improve the situation. 
 
Due to the strong politization of water issues, Central Asian water cooperation is becoming 
a field for diplomats and foreign ministries (136). Additionally the need to defend national 
interests instead of integrated solutions has been highlighted with transboundary water man-
agement being centered around bilateral state-centric decision-making (136). A notable issue 
is the neglection of international water principles and best practices (145). This is explained 
in some cases by the treaties being instruments of their time, when the aforementioned prin-
ciples were not as strong and universally acknowledged as today. It should be noted how-
ever, that at least some of the international principles have been incorporated in many re-
gional treaties. 
5.2 Conflict Paths 
Formulating the Conflict Paths for the case 
study areas built on the analysis of current 
state, complemented with relevant key 
trends and drivers. The logic of establish-
ing the Conflict Paths and related water di-
plomacy actions is presented in Figure 15. 
In Conflict Path A, water conflicts escalate 
through water-related tensions (i.e. water 
mixing with politics), while in Conflict 
Path B the political tensions lead to water 
use becoming political (3). Similarly, wa-
ter diplomacy actions are then either wa-
ter-related (A) or political and diplomatic 
(B) (3).  
 
Climate change is possibly the most relevant future driver in Central Asia as its impacts are 
expected to be severe. Dry periods are estimated to become longer, seasonal rainfall more 
erratic, extreme weather events more frequent and the mean temperature in the whole region 
will rise (96). The average temperature of Central Asia has risen by 0.5 °C during the last 
three decades and is expected to rise between 2.0 °C to 5.7 °C by 2085 (96). The glaciers 
will be affected most, while seasonal water fluctuations will have a detrimental effect on 
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Figure 15: Creating Conflict Paths 
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agriculture in the downstream countries (77, 126). Droughts and desertification are already 
significant problems and their effects will only grow more severe in the future (16, 77). Table 
3 showcases the most pressing dangers of climate change in Central Asia (96). 
 
Table 3: The effects of climate change in Central Asia 
Effects on Water Resources Effects on Agriculture Effects on Energy sources 
Glacial melting: changes in sea-
sonal water availability 
Variations in seasonal water availa-
bility 
Changes in seasonal energy de-
mand 
Reduced availability of drinking wa-
ter and irrigation water 
Lowered crop yields: danger to 
food security 
Lowered reliability and production 
of hydropower  
More frequent land and mud slides 
 
Increased salinification and deserti-
fication of land 
Storm damage in energy infrastruc-
ture 
 
The current population of Central Asia is around 73 million, and it is growing at an annual 
rate of 1.4%: projected population in the area will thus be around 82 million in 2030 and 94 
million in 2050 (98). The growth is significant when taking into account the uneven popu-
lation density in the region. In 2019, 39.1% of the people lived in cities, which is expected 
to rise to 41.5% in 2030 and 49.2% in 2050 (98). 
 
Future water scarcity was investigated with the Water Scarcity Atlas, designed at Aalto Uni-
versity (for more information, see Chapter 3 Methodology). In Figure 16 we show water 
stress (the percentage of available water used) according to three socio-economic scenarios 
and two levels of crop yield improvement (13). Using a high percentage of available water 
(even 20%) means that it becomes more difficult to access the resource sustainably. Water 
users need to handle conflict or cooperation, as well as handling increasing costs of accessing 
water and environmental impacts. 
 
The socio-economic scenarios include changes in domestic and industrial water use quanti-
fied by IIASA’s Water Futures and Solutions program based on the Shared Socio-economic 
Pathways, developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (82, 83). 
Figure 16: Water stress predictions in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya (13) 
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The scenarios respectively corresponding to “Sustainability”, “Middle of the road” and “Re-
gional rivalry”. Irrigation areas are kept constant, but irrigation water use takes into account 
climate change projections. The effect of crop yield improvements assumes that water use 
can be scaled down if productivity is improved, as examined by Kummu et al. (146). 
 
Figure 16 shows that crop yield improvements are key for the future of Central Asia. If there 
are no changes in agricultural methods, all of the inspected regions (Amu Darya & Syr 
Darya) are clearly over the set 20% boundary for water stress. Even with medium changes, 
the population living under water stress is significantly lower. There are some uncertainties 
about the effect of future socio-economic development on domestic and industrial water use 
and therefore water stress. In general, however, there is substantial potential for improve-
ment in water productivity that would potentially allow water to be freed up for other uses. 
Water is allocated within basins proportionally to river flows, so water sharing agreements 
may also change the situation. 
 
Conflict Path A: Shared waters in a changing climate 
Conflict Path A is based on water related tensions. Three critical aspects for the region were 
identified: the effects of climate change to water resources, the unsustainable water use 
trends in agriculture and large-scale hydropower projects in upstream countries.  
 
Central Asia is at its heart a dry region, which has been cultivated thanks to a massive net-
work of canals (77). Decades of unsustainable water use especially in agriculture has taken 
its toll on the region’s largest rivers, Amu Darya and Syr Darya, which both feed the dried-
up Aral Sea (77). The relative returns from water in Central Asia are lower than anywhere 
in the world (91). Glacial melting and changes in seasonal water availability was already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, but this scenario concentrates also specifically on the 
Fergana valley, where numerous smaller streams and canals transcend national boundaries 
(77, 120). 
 
The effects of large hydropower projects especially on seasonal water availability is a grow-
ing concern for downstream countries due to the implications on food security (77, 126). 
Neighbouring hydropower projects can be an easy target for blame when water runs out. 
 
Conflict Path B: Lack of cooperation takes center stage 
Conflict Path B is based on tensions related to geopolitics and regional cooperation. In this 
conflict path the standout theme is a lack of a regional water cooperation organization. 
 
Central Asian nations have recently expressed their interest in regional cooperation, but a 
lack of trust and dissatisfaction with earlier institutions make it difficult (77). As climate 
change makes access to basic needs more difficult, the possibility of regional shifts, such as 
ones seen during the Arab Spring are not out of the question (91). Similarly, to the Middle 
East, changes in fossil fuel prices (especially oil) can have a detrimental effect on the econ-
omies of downstream countries (77). 
 
The interests of great powers such as China and Russia are difficult to predict. China has 
invested huge amounts of money in national infrastructure and energy networks through 
BRI, while Russia has a strong historical influence and a military presence in the region 
(116).  
 
   
 38 
The created Conflict Paths (A and B) are showcased in Figure 17. As stated before, they 
represent coherent and believable (but not necessarily most likely) descriptions of the future. 
 
 
In addition to the conflict paths, several so called “wild card” (low-probability, high-impact) 
scenarios were identified for further study. These include terrorist attacks, power vacuums 
after long-term leadership changes and environmental catastrophes. 
5.3 Possible water diplomacy actions 
The third and final step in the analytical framework is the recognition of possible water di-
plomacy actions. In accordance with the Conflict Paths, the actions are also divided into 
water-related actions (A) as well as into policy- and diplomacy-related actions (B), and they 
build partly on already on-going activities in the region. It must be noted, however, that the 
recognised actions are indicative only, as they provide just the authors’ view building on the 
current state analysis and the defined Conflict Paths. In an actual water diplomacy analysis, 
recognition of such actions should be done in close collaboration with key international, 
regional and national actors working on the region. 
 
 
 
Conflict Path A: water driven
Regional collaboration remains sporadic and ineffective, and the countries’ agricultural and energy 
sectors are slow to change. The unwillingness of the countries to share openly climate- and 
water-related information is one factor hindering water-related cooperation.
Conflict Path B: politically driven
As agricultural water use stays unchanged, 
the major regional rivers of Amu Darya and 
Syr Darya experience droughts.
The effects of climate change begin to show: the volume of Central Asian glacier has halved. 
The rise of average temperatures have led to peak water flows happening earlier, affecting 
agriculture and other water uses across the region. Extreme weather events grow more common.
The lack of a functioning cooperative water 
organisation prevents regional water treaties 
from being updated.
As the agricultural sector suffers, the economies 
of downstream countries are in trouble.
Major international partners require differing 
economic and political guarantees in order to 
continue investments in the region.
2
0
2
0
Uzbekistan blames the lack of water on the 
Rogun dam, which already during construction 
affects the flow of the Amu Darya.
Tadzhikistan begins to fill the Rogun reservoir, 
which together with prolonged drought leads to 
notable flow changes and water shortages.
The streams in the Ferghana valley dry up, 
leading first into local conflicts that soon 
escalate into conflicts between the countries.
The global demand for fossil fuels lowers 
dramatically due to climate change mitigation 
actions, hurting the economies of 
downstream countries.
Unemployed workers blame the governments 
and neighboring countries for inaction. Local 
conflicts erupt in the Ferghana valley.
Countries blame each other and a peaceful 
solution cannot be found due to a lack of 
cooperative mechanisms.
Ethnic tensions increase due to population growth especially in the densely populated Ferghana valley, 
where rivers and streams crisscross national boundaries. The smaller water resources are also more 
susceptible to changes in consumption and climate.
2
0
3
0
Figure 17: Conflict Paths in Central Asia 
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• Open access to climate change-related data (A): Climate change related data in 
the Central Asian countries is currently not entirely open due to national security 
concerns (16). Given the importance of climate change as key driver for water man-
agement in the region, a neutral and open database for detailed climate change data 
-including its estimated impacts to water resources- could enhance understanding of 
water-related pressures in the region. 
• Revitalising and revising regional water treaties (A): While Central Asia has some 
existing water treaties, they are partly outdated and/or not functioning very well 
(134).  Current treaties also focus on only certain aspects of water use and manage-
ment, such as regulating water use for agricultural needs. As a longer-term water 
diplomacy action, it would therefore be crucial that existing water treaties and insti-
tutions are first of all revitalised i.e. returned to use and also revised so that they take 
the different water uses and users equally into consideration, building on the general 
principles provided by international water conventions. The upstream countries are 
yet to sign the UNECE convention or UNWC, which should be brought up as cor-
nerstones for regional cooperation. 
• Improved water efficiency (A): Agriculture in Central Asia is water intensive, 
meaning that improvements in water efficiency could bring benefits to the entire re-
gion, including both bigger and smaller transboundary water bodies. This process 
can be supported by international partners, including Finland and the EU.  
• Joint regional organisation for natural disaster forecasting and relief (B): One 
possible way forward in terms of more general regional cooperation would be the 
establishment of a joint regional organisation for disaster forecasting and relief. This 
could be beneficial for local populations, particularly in the highly populated Fergana 
valley, and could thus enhance collaboration both at local and national scales. 
• Enhanced economic cooperation (B): Central Asian countries have a remarkable 
potential to diversify their economies and enhance their economic cooperation in the 
region due to the populations’ relatively high education level, remarkable natural re-
sources and important geopolitical situation (91). 
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6 Discussion 
 
The quality and reliability of the established analytical framework (primary objective of the 
thesis) is analysed in this discussion section. The section is divided into two parts: a meth-
odological discussion on the analytical framework and a context-based discussion on case 
study results. 
6.1 Methodological discussion on the analytical framework 
Methodologically there are three main findings for this study: i) the establishment of an an-
alytical framework for water diplomacy, ii) the creation of Conflict Paths based on a basic 
scenario process and iii) the results from testing the analytical framework with case studies. 
All these three finding are next discussed briefly. 
 
Analytical framework 
The main objective of an analytical framework is to structure thinking in order for an analysis 
to have tangible outcomes. According to Cai (88), analytical frameworks can contribute to 
research in three ways, of which the first two are: i) by advancing our understanding and ii) 
by making it easier to compare studies and possibly develop synergies between them. 
 
The established analytical framework succeeds in both of these steps. Firstly, a clear strength 
of the framework is that it brings a novel approach to the study of water conflicts by concen-
trating on the core focus of water diplomacy: disagreements and disputes (4). Additionally, 
the analytical approach answers the suggestion by Farinosi et al. (66) that further concentra-
tion in water diplomacy analyses should be put into regional or sub-regional contexts and 
specific transnational river basins, where rapid population growth, climate change and un-
sustainable development are key factors in future research. 
 
The clear structure of the analytical framework should make it easy to use the framework 
also in other regions and thus compare the results. However, further regional and sub-re-
gional analyses are needed to prove this hypothesis. The scope of the current state analysis 
is narrow, but sufficient enough in providing the needed context for any region with potential 
for water diplomacy actions. 
 
Despite the noted issues it can be concluded that the established framework contains the key 
elements for a water diplomacy analytical framework. It brings together water cooperation 
as well as diplomacy and security while providing a foundation for future water diplomacy 
analysis. 
 
Conflict Paths 
The third way that analytical frameworks can contribute to research is by helping policy-
makers and other practitioners to find and develop innovative solutions to challenges (88). 
In the analytical framework, this was accomplished through region-specific Conflict Paths, 
that were based on a simple scenario process. The paths were then studied to identify the 
roots of the problems, to which potential water diplomacy actions were created. As Doucey 
(87) states: “understanding the root causes of conflict and its psychological dimension is 
crucial for sustainable peace building”. 
 
   
 41 
The undesirable Conflict Paths proved to be a useful tool in identifying at least some of the 
roots of the water-related tensions in the case study regions. A novelty of the scenario pro-
cess was its concentration on solely undesired outcomes in order to identify as many starting 
points for possible tensions as possible (147). These starting points where then used as foun-
dations for the water diplomacy actions. In this way, the Conflict Paths helped in discovering 
connections between water cooperation and diplomacy as well as raising awareness on pos-
sible threats. 
 
Water diplomacy is a truly multi-disciplinary field and the added knowledge of experts in 
fields such as politics, peace and conflict studies or anthropology could provide valuable 
input to similar studies in the future (18, 70). This study also omitted research into the actor 
networks in the case study regions, as the objectives were centered on building Finnish water 
diplomacy capacity. A thorough actor network analysis on a local, regional and international 
level could provide valuable insight into science-policy interactions, which are often lacking 
in similar analyses (18, 46). 
 
Case studies 
Our findings regarding the analytical framework are supported by the results from the case 
study analyses. The case studies proved that the framework can be used to meaningfully 
investigate regions and individual states and form a clear picture of their current state. The 
aforementioned Conflict Paths formed the basis of suggested water diplomacy actions for 
the case study regions. 
 
The decision to choose two case study regions instead of one proved to be the right one, as 
it created the possibility to compare the case studies through identified similarities and dif-
ferences. A major motivation for the decision was the possibility of gathering more compel-
ling evidence and improving the robustness of the analysis (85). 
 
It would be interesting to recreate the analysis on different regions to find out if the same 
similarities could be identified and used in finding areas that could benefit from water diplo-
macy measures. These characteristics could provide a valuable addition to studies that rely 
heavily on quantitative analysis and help in understanding the phenomena and mechanisms 
behind water conflicts, as suggested by Farinosi et al. (66). 
 
Limitations 
Due to the vast amount of available literature coupled with time and resource constraints it 
was necessary to limit the scope of the analysis to ensure its effectiveness. However, this did 
create some limitations for this study. 
 
First of all, the accuracy of the current state analysis in the case study areas can be debated, 
as the author lacked comprehensive knowledge of the regions. Although this was remedied 
partly through the expert interviews, a more inclusive study with potentially local experts 
would be needed in the future, especially as time constraints limited the number of interviews 
and workshops. There are also some issues related to the reliability of the results, as the 
research articles were studied only in English and Finnish, leaving a wide gap of knowledge 
especially regarding the case study regions. 
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Secondly, creating the Conflict Paths was not without uncertainties and problems either. 
Again, accuracy proved to be a core problem, as many parts of the Conflict Paths can be 
seen to lack robust arguments and are instead based on the authors own views and interpre-
tations. Additionally, the perspective on the current state analysis and creation of the conflict 
paths was heavily Finnish, as the water diplomacy report was compiled for the MFA of 
Finland in Finnish. On the other hand, according to the IPCC, scenarios only need to be 
internally consistent and plausible (79), but not necessary the most probable outcomes. This 
gave the author a sufficient level of freedom required to create effective Conflict Paths. 
 
Final and rather major limitation was the lack of time, which meant that the whole water 
diplomacy analysis was carried out by a few researchers, yet it is clear that a proper water 
diplomacy analysis would benefit from a broader involvement of international experts 
through for example workshops regarding the Conflict Paths as well as more detailed quan-
titative future research. Such further studies are clearly needed. 
6.2 Discussion on case study results 
The similarity between the two case studies of Central Asia (Chapter 5) and Iraq (Appendix 
I) is striking. Both are characterized by a strong upstream-downstream imbalance regarding 
natural resources. Possibly the most notable similarity is the shared lack of regular dialogue 
and cooperative organizations, which usually form the backbone of water diplomacy. The 
situation in Iraq is critical as there is currently no active water cooperation between it and 
upstream Turkey, while in Central Asia there are cooperative mechanisms, but they are out-
dated and lack mandate. 
 
In general, a more precise investigation into the local circumstances is needed in order to 
identify the actors, institutions and interactions as well as verify the collective problem, that 
has led to the creation of social norms (148). As Hufty (148) states, all societies develop 
their own way of decision-making and conflict resolution, which needs to be charted before 
trying to implement water diplomacy measures. The fact is, that these complex networks 
cannot be comprehensively studied without on-site knowledge. 
 
A similar study was carried out by Huntjens et al. (14) issued by the Hague Institute of 
Global Justice, in which a multi-track water diplomacy framework was established and 
tested. The study has a similar objective of creating practical solutions for water diplomacy 
by identifying benefit-sharing across sectors. Due to the novelty of the study, the results from 
the case studies in the Brahmaputra and Jordan basins could not yet be compared. However, 
this could provide an interesting study opportunity for the future. 
 
Discussion on the Central Asia case study 
The results from the case study of Central Asia indicate that historical internal and regional 
tensions over water still reflect on the current state. The main finding regarding water diplo-
macy measures was the need to strengthen regional dialogue and establish a trusted organi-
zation for water resources cooperation. 
 
The suggested water diplomacy measures were sorted in order of rising difficulty, with the 
idea of beginning with the first steps of cooperation, such as sharing climate change related 
knowledge and establishing a joint disaster forecasting, prevention and aid system. These 
cooperative steps could in turn lead to updated regional water treaties and the establishment 
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of a trusted organization for water cooperation. Foreign development aid could focus in in-
troducing new less water intensive crops and support in diversifying the economies as also 
suggested by Varis (91). 
 
Finnish actors in Central Asia were contacted in order to gain a wider understanding of the 
situation in the region. However, to be certain of the need and effectiveness of the measures, 
further research is needed. A clear limitation of the analysis is the lack of a study on the local 
actors and their interests. Such an investigation could prove indispensable to carry out the 
suggested water diplomacy measures with local help. Reed et al. (149) identifies possible 
methods, such as interest-influence matrices, actor networks and rainbow diagrams, which 
could be very useful for such an analysis. The conflict-cooperation matrix, developed by 
Mirumachi (150) could also prove useful in studying the development of conflicts and their 
mechanisms. 
 
Discussion on the Iraq case study 
There is a clear lesson learned from the Iraq case study regarding the different levels of water 
diplomacy and their connections. By concentrating on an individual state, the internal situa-
tion could be studied more thoroughly than in the case of Central Asia. On the other hand, 
the scope of the study had to be expanded to neighbouring countries due to the transboundary 
nature of the countries water resources. 
 
Due to the complex nature of the current state of Iraq, it should be noted that all of the levels 
of water diplomacy (regional, transboundary, bilateral and national) have a significant role 
in furthering proactive peace mediation. In fact, all of the obstacles for successful water 
cooperation identified by Genderen and Rood (17) are present in Iraq. 
 
In the Spring of 2019, the Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan announced that he expects the 
filling of the Ilisu reservoir to begin in the summer, which could lead to severe water short-
ages downstream, highlighting the urgency of the situation (151). The foremost water diplo-
macy measure for the nation is to establish regional water cooperation mechanisms, such as 
river basin organization with Turkey, as stated in the possible actions. These steps could in 
turn mitigate the general hostile situation in the region. 
 
The future of Iraq regarding climate change, security, politics and economy is challenging. 
Iraq is completely reliant on transboundary waters from upstream countries, but water coop-
eration is practically non-existent due to recent conflicts and a lack of trust between the 
countries. Based on our analysis, there is a clear need for water diplomacy in Iraq, but im-
plementing the stated measures is easier said than done. Challenges and obstacles are abun-
dant while resources are scarce and future international actions may be required.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
Water diplomacy is a relatively novel topic, which is why previous research has focused on 
large entities on a global scale. Therefore, the primary objective of this thesis was to establish 
an analytical framework for more detailed scale (i.e. regional and national) water diplomacy 
analysis with the help of scenario thinking. Finally, the functionality of the framework was 
studied with two case studies: Central Asia and Iraq. 
 
To help with the primary objective, the following Research Questions were identified: 
 
• How to define water diplomacy? 
• What are the key elements of an analytical framework for water diplomacy? 
• How scenario thinking can help to recognize potential for water diplomacy actions? 
 
The findings of the analysis show that the Research Questions were closely interlinked. De-
fining water diplomacy proved crucial in identifying the key elements for the analytical 
framework, such as the Conflict Paths. The following definition for multi-track water diplo-
macy was identified: “Water diplomacy is a process that provides means to prevent and mit-
igate water-related political tensions by making simultaneous use of water know-how and 
diplomatic tools and mechanisms. In this way, water diplomacy complements water cooper-
ation through its focus on the ‘political’ and acknowledgement of the differing interests of 
relevant actors.” (6). 
 
The identification of different scales of water diplomacy focused the study to regional level 
for the Central Asia case study, and to national / bilateral level for the Iraq case study. Sce-
nario thinking was then used to create undesired Conflict Paths for both case study regions. 
This proved instrumental in identifying possible roots for conflict, which then functioned as 
the foundation for possible water diplomacy actions. The process proved to be simple yet 
effective and well suited for the scope of this analysis. 
 
After developing the Conflict Paths, the analytical framework was established with the iden-
tified key elements. The three-step framework was structured in the following manner: anal-
ysis of the current state (1st step), two Conflict Paths (2nd step) and finally possible water 
diplomacy actions, that could be used to mitigate and resolve water-related tensions and 
conflicts (3rd step). 
 
The framework was then utilized in the analysis of the case study regions, with positive 
results. The decision to choose two case study regions proved to be the right choice as it 
created the possibility to compare the two regions and gave robustness and credibility to the 
analysis. As mentioned in the Discussion section, there are limitations and opportunities for 
development, which is why the author hopes that the established analytical framework will 
be updated in the future. 
 
This master’s thesis continued the work of the MFA project “Vesidiplomatia - ennakoivaa 
rauhanvälitystoimintaa” (Water Diplomacy - Proactive Peace Mediation) (6). As such, it 
helped move Finland’s national water diplomacy agenda forward and possibly on to gaining 
institutional recognition on a global scale. As a result of the project, a Finnish water diplo-
macy network was created, which aims to strategically bring together ministries and relevant 
stakeholders to advance peaceful and sustainable development globally. 
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The need for water diplomacy policy and actions is highlighted in the Council of the EU 
conclusions from 2018. They state that “the Council intends to enhance EU diplomatic en-
gagement about water as a tool for peace, security and stability, and firmly condemns the 
use of water as a weapon of war (44). The Council also underlines the EU’s commitment to 
“promoting transboundary and integrated water management as well as effective water gov-
ernance” (5). 
 
The findings of this thesis provide a viable analytical framework for regional and national 
water diplomacy analysis, that can be used anywhere in the world. The approach is particu-
larly suited for developing countries or regions where climate change, rapid population 
growth and societal context are key factors. The analytical framework can also be used to 
support Finland’s international water strategy or larger schemes, such as the ones stated by 
the Council of the EU (152).  
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Appendix 1: Main Findings from the Iraq Case Study 
Iraq is situated in the area historically known as the Fertile Crescent between and around the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, surrounded by Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria and 
Turkey (153). In recent years, the security situation in Iraq and the surrounding region has 
been aggravated by the terrorist organisation ISIS, which at the height of its power controlled 
over a third of the country (154). Currently, stability in the region is undermined by escalated 
tensions between the USA and Iran (155). The emergence of ISIS is interconnected to vari-
ous societal, economic and environmental security threats that are all aggravated by climate 
change (153). The population of Iraq is growing with an alarming rate, while economically 
the country is extremely dependent on fluctuating oil prices (98, 156). Climate change is a 
major concern, with diminished agricultural livelihoods and complete dependency on for-
eign water sources already causing tensions (153, 154). 
Current state 
Society and politics 
• The population of Iraq is 39 million people (2017) with the median age being ap-
proximately 20 years and annual population growth rate 3% (98). The population 
is centered around the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, with 70% of people living in 
urban areas (98). 
• Iraq is an Islamic society with the two dominant branches, Shia and Sunni, more 
equally represented than in any other state. Iraq has historic tensions with its neigh-
bour Iran due to past conflicts and religious differences (155). Recent friendlier 
relations have soured due to US troops still stationed in Iraq (157). 
• There is a notable Kurdish population living in the northern province of Kurdistan. 
The Syrian refugee crisis has led to an estimated 250 000 registered refugees and 
countless unregistered more to be stranded in the region (99). 
• The economy of Iraqi economy is extremely dependent on its large oil reserves 
and oil exports (90% of national income) (154, 156). Agriculture constitutes only 
5% of GDP but 25% of national livelihoods (154). 
 
Water resources and climate change 
• Iraq is completely dependent on the water resources of its neighbours, namely Tur-
key, Iran and Syria (153, 154, 158). Both of Iraq’s major rivers, the Euphrates and 
Tigris, originate from Turkey (158, 159). 
• Iraqi water security is highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, agricul-
ture and upstream dam projects. In 2018, Turkey completed the construction of the 
Ilisu dam on the Tigris with the filling of the reservoir expected to begin in 2019 
(151). This could lower water flow to Iraq by up to 60% (159). 
• Climate change is expected to have severe impacts on Iraq, such as increased an-
nual temperatures, extreme weather events and a decrease in annual rainfall (153). 
This will lead to more water shortages and food insecurity (153, 154). 
• Iraq lacks a national water management plan and does not have funds to execute 
its water resource strategy (154). 
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Law and cooperative mechanisms 
• Iraq has signed the UNWC in 2001 and is on the verge of signing the UNECE 
water convention (160). Many of the principles of the treaties are already binding 
as customary law norms. 
• Iraq has only signed bilateral treaties regarding its transboundary waters due to 
differing views on the legal status of the Euphrates and Tigris (68). The treaties do 
not cover the overall management of the rivers. 
• The Iraqi constitution states that the state should take care of transboundary water 
resources and ensure their availability (161). A national water law is in the draft 
stage but has not been completed due to the difficult internal situation. 
• There is a clear need for enhanced regional cooperation as there are currently no 
active RBOs for the Euphrates or Tigris (68). 
 
Conflict Paths 
The second step of the water diplomacy 
analysis was formulating the Conflict Paths. 
The logic of establishing the Conflict Paths 
and related water diplomacy actions is pre-
sented in Figure 18. In Conflict Path A, wa-
ter conflicts escalate through water-related 
tensions (i.e. water mixing with politics), 
while in Conflict Path B the political ten-
sions lead to water use becoming political 
(3). Similarly, water diplomacy actions are 
then either water-related (A) or political and 
diplomatic (B) (3).  
 
Climate change is a major future driver in relation to water in Iraq. It is estimated that 
precipitation will decrease by 9%, while the average temperature will rise by 2 °C by 2050 
(154). Heat waves, sand storms and desertification will increase, with dire consequences on 
water resources and food security (153).  
 
Future water scarcity was 
analysed with the Water 
Scarcity Atlas, designed at 
Aalto University (13). The 
findings showed that by im-
proving the water effi-
ciency of agricultural meth-
ods, it is possible to sub-
stantially decrease the per-
centage of population liv-
ing in water scarce areas 
(Figure 19). 
Water 
related 
tensions
Political 
tensions
B. Utilising 
diplomatic tools
A. Water facts 
to the political 
table
WATER 
CONFLICT
WATER 
DIPLOMACY
PEACE AND 
COOPERATION
CONFLICT 
PATH B
CONFLICT 
PATH A
Figure 19: Future water stress in the Tigris and Euphrates Basins (13) 
Figure 18: Creating Conflict Paths 
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According to UN Pop-
ulation Division, the 
population of Iraq is 
expected to reach 53 
million people by 2030 
and over 81 million 
people by 2050) (98). 
Urbanisation in Iraq is 
at 70% very high and 
might further increase 
due to climate change 
and stressors. 
 
The key elements of 
Conflict Paths for Iraq 
are illustrated in Figure 
20. Building on our an-
alytical framework, the 
two paths were built 
through water-related 
tensions (A) and politi-
cal tensions related to 
geopolitics and a lack 
of regional cooperation 
(B). The timeframe for 
both Conflict Paths is 
until 2030, with climate 
change being a major 
source of tension. 
 
In addition to the conflict paths, several so called “wild card” (low-probability, high-impact) 
scenarios were identified for further study. These include the effects of single extreme 
weather events such as prolonged droughts, the emergence of new or existing terrorist or-
ganisations and escalating regional tensions especially between the USA and Iran. 
Possible water diplomacy actions 
The third and final step in the analytical framework is the recognition of possible water di-
plomacy actions. In accordance with the Conflict Paths, the actions are also divided into 
water-related actions (A) as well as into policy- and diplomacy-related actions (B), and they 
build partly on already on-going activities in the region. It must be noted, however, that the 
recognised actions are indicative only, as they provide just the authors’ view building on the 
current state analysis and the defined Conflict Paths. In actual water diplomacy analysis, 
recognition of such actions should be done in close collaboration with key international, 
regional and national actors working on the region. 
 
• Monitoring climate-related risks (A): Climate change will have severe effects on 
the water resources of Iraq and the whole region (153, 154). As a result, a systematic 
and open database for climate change and its estimated impacts would benefit water 
resources management both nationally and regionally.
The national water law planning and water strategy implementation do not progress due to political 
uncertainties, instability and lack of resources. Dialogue between Iraq and its neighbors on regional 
collaboration is not functioning. Turkey begins to fill the reservoir of Ilisu dam.
The filling of the Ilisu reservoir substantially 
reduces the water flow to Iraq, affecting the 
lives of millions of people.
Rapid population growth (projected population in 2025: 47 million people) and climate change 
impacts increase the pressure on Iraq’s water resources and agriculture. The Iraqi population is 
divided and demands the government to improve the situation.
Filling Ilisu (Turkey) and Daryan (Iran) dams 
affects the water flow to Kurdistan. The Kurds 
begin their own dam projects.
The smaller flow combined with temperature 
rise critically affects the agricultural sector, 
leading to farmers migrating to urban areas.
The Iraqi government commands Kurdistan to 
halt the dam projects. The Kurds are only willing 
to accept for further autonomy gains.
Conflict Path A: water driven Conflict Path B: politically driven
2
0
2
0
Local conflicts erupt between the Iraqi government forces and the Kurds. At the same time 
climate refugees begin to move towards the north, escalating the refugee crisis and creating 
heightened tensions with Turkey and EU countries.
The Iraqi governments answers to the water-
related riots with force, which soon escalates 
into broader civil war.
The conflict in Iraq spreads over the border into Turkey. Engagement of regional and
international actors complicate the situation further.
The Iraqi government forces take control of 
Kurdistan to put an end to the dam projects. 
Refugee crisis leads to water shortage and 
pollution, resulting in riots, disorder and chaos.
Reduced global demand for oil (due to climate
change mitigation actions) puts major economic 
and political pressure on the government. 
2
0
3
0
Figure 20: Conflict Paths in Iraq 
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• Enhancing active water cooperation through dialogue (A): Establishing active 
water cooperation between Iraq and its neighbours can be seen as a priority in terms 
of water cooperation and water diplomacy. A possible first step could be the intro-
duction of RBOs either independently or as a part of a larger regional cooperation 
mechanism. International actors could support dialogue between the countries as 
well as provide technical support for the organisations (154). 
• Capacity building through scenarios (B): Failing infrastructure, outdated agricul-
tural practices, political instability, corruption and climate change all need long term 
solutions (154, 158). One way to build understanding and capacity to respond to these 
major challenges could be a multisectoral scenario process. 
• Revising national water and climate policy (B): The population living in water 
scarce areas in Iraq is expected to double by 2050 (158). The Iraqi government aims 
to search for new groundwater sources and improve current infrastructure, but this 
requires firm policies as well as financial and technical support (154, 158). One prac-
tical step forward would be the establish a revised water and climate policy for Iraq, 
considering economic, social and environmental implications of water-related plans. 
 
 
